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A case study of the contributions of the special commission on the reorganization of higher education, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, November 14, 1979 to June, 1980.

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A CASE STUDY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON THE REORGANIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
NOVEMBER 14, 1979 TO JUNE, 1980

A Dissertation Presented

By

JAMES JOSEPH DOWD

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May 1981

Education



James Joseph Dowd 1981
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
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
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
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
David Schuman, Chairperson



Harry Schuman, Member



Richard Clark, Member



Mario Fantini, Dean
School of Education

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation with great love to my wife, Sally, who has provided me with the love and affection which has enabled me to complete this work.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my tremendous gratitude to the members of an outstanding committee.

The chairperson, Dr. David Schuman, provided the highest quality of leadership possible, and constantly gave me counsel and encouragement which enabled me to complete my work.

Dr. Harry Schumer was a great help to me because of his advisory comments, and frequently enabled me to view issues in a new way because of his perceptive questioning of my work in progress.

Dr. Richard Clark gave me a great deal of encouragement, also and was another pillar of strength for me on the committee.

My sincere thanks are also given to Dr. Harvey Scribner, Dr. Robert Woodbury, Dr. William Greene, Dr. David Flight and George Psychas.

I wish to commend the staff members of the Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education for their courtesy and their unfailing help.

I sincerely wish to thank Mrs. Shirley Cantwell for proofreading this work.

ABSTRACT

A Case Study of the Contributions of the Special
Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
November 14, 1979 to June, 1980
(May, 1981)

James Joseph Dowd, B.S.E., Westfield State, M. Ed.,
Westfield State, Ed. D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. David Schuman

This dissertation provides an in depth study of the activities and contributions of the Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education through the period from November 14, 1979 to June, 1980. References have also been made to events and activities taking place both before and after the subject period.

The initial activities of the Commission received particular emphasis in this study, because they set the stage for later direction. I have carefully noted the types and quality of leadership which surfaced within the Commission, and their effects upon that body.

The importance of the time element has been stressed on many occasions in the dissertation. The commencement of the Commission's work took place amidst an aura of no apparent worry relative to the time span within which to work, but the

last chapters of the dissertation indicate the frantic haste with which the Commission tried to complete its work.

Forces which acted upon the Commission, both internal and external, have been cited and reviewed. The interaction of Commission members with their colleagues and with people outside the Commission has been clearly delineated. The relationship of the Commission with the Governor and the legislature proved to be critical, and the dissertation provides an accurate appraisal of the depth and sincerity pertaining to that relationship.

I have been able to provide the essence of this case study by means of firsthand observation of Commission meetings, discussions with Commission members and staff, review of notes, minutes and recordings of Commission meetings, and a vast amount of reading.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	v
ABSTRACT	vi
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION: THE INITIAL MEETING	12
III. PRESENTATIONS TO THE COMMISSION	23
IV. NEW DIRECTIONS	35
Time Span I	36
Time Span II	42
Time Span III	45
V. OUTSIDE FORCES INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT COMMISSION	53
Time Span I	56
Time Span II	61
Time Span III	70
VI. MARATHON SESSION	76
Day I -- May 16, 1980	76
Day II -- May 17, 1980	88
VII. THE FINAL STROKE	94
Finishing Touches	95
Import of Disaster	105
A Devastating Experience	107
VIII. SUMMARY: FACT AND SPECULATION	110
Hypothesis	114
Observations	114
FOOTNOTES	119

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	127
APPENDICES	133
A. A.A. Michelson's Article Relative to Budget . .	134
B. Members of Special Commission	140
C. Trustee Position Paper on Reorganization	142
D. Bibliography of Reorganization Proposals	155
E. Governance Committee Goals	158
F. Governance Committee Report	160
G. Record of Commission Meetings	168
H. Massachusetts House Bill 6200	170
I. Attendance Record of Commission Members	174

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to provide an in depth study of the contributions of the Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, November 14, 1979 to June, 1980.

The dissertation will examine the creation and subsequent operation of the Commission. The pace of the Commission's creation was a slow one, and the reasons for that slowness will be looked at. The reasons are important not only as they pertain to the formation of the Commission, but also as they can be related to subsequent events.

The actions of the staff and members of the Commission are worthy of close observation, and an assessment will be made of those efforts as well.

The dissertation will provide a close look at the workings of the executive and legislative branches of Massachusetts government, and show how both branches interact with a Special Commission.

The dissertation will provide observations of what is offered in general within public higher education in Massachusetts, and will show how the present systems of governance are structured within public higher education.

Educators will be shown in action, and the author will take pains to show items which were initiated by educators to enhance the work of the Special Commission, and also to show instances whereby the work of educators created obstacles for the Special Commission.

The workings of power, the levels of leadership, and the numbing effects of outside forces on the Commission will also be recorded in this dissertation.

Finally, the dissertation will effectively record the machinations, progress, regression and internal struggles of a Commission charged with the reorganization of Massachusetts public higher education in a state which historically has proved to be almost on the edge of paucity with regard to the financing of public higher education, and whose state legislature has numbered among its members several who have seemed bent on destroying at least a portion of the current systems of public higher education.

Many topics will be addressed in the dissertation, but the principal thrust of the dissertation will be a case study of the Special Commission, and all other topics will be utilized solely as a means to a better understanding of the Special Commission's work.

Of the outside forces referred to before, (and the dissertation will show many of them), none was more powerful than the Massachusetts legislature.

The power of appropriative bodies is immense; in the

case of the Massachusetts legislature, the power is awesome.

For example, several years ago a Massachusetts State Representative (not now a current member), was quoted on a commercial radio station news broadcast around budget time as follows:

"...and that begins next week when the college presidents come in, and the Hammer of Thor lands on them, and squashes some of them like the bugs that they are."¹ Those are just the sentiments of one former member.

Those sentiments, colorful as they are, indicate an attitude common to many in the legislature which reflects a disdain for certain agencies, and especially for those connected with educational pursuits. Sometimes the disdain gains awesome proportions.

To illustrate the last assertion, the Massachusetts budget for fiscal year 1980 contained a provision (passed by the House and Senate) that would have affected many administrators within the Massachusetts State College system.² Specifically, Section 49 of House 6400 called for the reduction in salary of any administrative (non-bargaining unit) personnel who had an established salary of thirty thousand dollars or more per annum as of July 1, 1978 to revert back to the existing salary of July 1, 1977 plus any additional benefits which might have accrued from the passage of Chapter 872 of the Acts of 1977.

The specific provision 49, found in the budget's outside language, was disapproved by Governor King, but its barbed implications for the State College system specifically, and for public higher education in general, did not give educators a comfortable feeling.

Part of the reason for the dissatisfaction of the legislature with public higher education was based on the action of the Massachusetts State College Board of Trustees naming former Westfield State College President Dr. Robert L. Randolph to a position on the Central Board staff after he had left his position at Westfield State College.³

In general, the latter part of 1978 and the early months of 1979 found public higher education taking a verbal beating from some members of the legislature.

The following quotes are representative of the legislative feeling toward public higher education during the time frame referred to above.

"The state colleges have been under fire because I don't think they can define their true mission."⁴

"Fiscal autonomy is the fly in the ointment, that's the problem...It gives them the green light to do whatever they damn well please."⁵

"...public higher education has not taken the initiative to correct abuses, and until it does, it risks losing fiscal autonomy."⁶

Thus, one can see that the formation of the Special

Commission on Reorganization did not take place at a time when the legislature exhibited kind feelings toward educators and education.

Not all members of the legislature, however, are completely vindictive sorts. Fortunately, some are logical, sharp-thinking and far-reaching in their thoughts.

It is easily perceived that the influence of the legislature extends not only to the writing and passage of legislation, and the acts of appropriation of monies, but their real sphere of influence occurs when the legislation and appropriations help to create an aura, a philosophy and a mood that extends in beneficial ways to some agencies, and causes difficult situations for others.

In recent years, anyway, it is not difficult to detect how the legislature felt about the financial support of public higher education.

For instance, in the calendar years 1977-78, Massachusetts was compared with all other states and the District of Columbia, and ranked as follows:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Category</u>
6	Tax Revenues
51	Allocation to Public Higher Education
46	Appropriations per Student
47	State Public Higher Education and Cost Index ⁷

Figures like those above seem incongruous when viewed at a time when reorganization of Massachusetts education by a Special Commission was being considered. Even though I

have only taken a few selected items to show, it is clear that the indicated magnitude of Massachusetts support of public higher education is nothing to be proud of.

It is clear that the legislature holds awesome power. And, much of this power is put directly into the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees. But it is also clear that the trend in Massachusetts has been a gradual but firm erosion of funding support for public higher education. Thus, that power of the legislature had not been used to support public higher education in a positive way within recent times.

Can the legislature, then, be expected to have a positive approach in dealing with public higher education in Massachusetts?

My opinion is that as long as the legislature actively holds the purse strings of the appropriations made each year by that body to public higher education, and as long as it continues to require that an agency cannot make internal changes in its budget (within certain accounts) without gaining the permission of either the House or Senate Ways and Means Committee, the status of public higher education will always be at a low level.

I am sure that my opinion is shared by many. In fact, many objective newspaper reporters have covered the Massachusetts State House beat for years. Supposedly, their comments reflect no bias, but only what they see and perceive. In a

comment pertaining to the attitude and actions of the House and Senate in the preparation of the FY 1980 Budget one of those reporters, Don Ebbeling, stated "Massachusetts taxpayers are becoming accustomed to this asinine and childish behavior of our legislators. And we are all being injured."⁸

Senator John Olver has described the working conditions of the legislature as he saw them in June of 1979. "It's a mean place. The atmosphere has been poisoned. Times are bad, inflation is getting worse, and people are looking for a scapegoat."⁹

In early 1980, Mayor Koch of New York City proposed a reduction of nine million dollars in that city's share of the cost of the CUNY nine community colleges. The reaction brought fire. "Officials, asserting that the community colleges were already seriously underfinanced, said that the proposed budget cut, even if ameliorated by a tuition increase, would lead to a serious curtailment of programs, course offerings and student services."¹⁰

In a report concerning public higher education in Nebraska, Lyman Glenny felt that the legislature is capable of coordinating the state higher education institutions in Nebraska,¹¹ but in another report says that legislators look at a higher education costs primarily in terms of students enrolled.¹²

An ominous warning note sounds when Glenny comments, "Legislatures, accountable only to the electorate, need not

and rarely do give reasons for particular appropriations in any formal and specific manner."¹³

Thus, in light of past results within Massachusetts relative to public higher education support by the legislature, and cognizant of the attitude (past and present) of some legislators towards public higher education, I again strongly state that the legislative influence on public higher education is of such a crushing force that it is by far the most potentially devastating force to be directed towards public higher education. Furthermore, I will show in the dissertation that the legislature was truly the most stultifying outside force on the Special Commission, and that the Commission was literally haunted by the spectre of the legislature through all of the 210 days of its existence. Finally, it succumbed to the inordinate strength of the House and Senate. The record will show, however, that actions of the Special Commission itself actually benefited the assault on it by the legislature.

Other outside forces existed, although none possessed the power of the legislature. These other forces would also exert an influence on the Commission's work.

Massachusetts has a 3 to 1 ratio of private colleges to public colleges, and the leaders of the private colleges, their trustees and their alumni showed immense interest in the forthcoming reorganization and the formation of the Special Commission.

In addition to the ongoing battle of competition with the private colleges, segments of public higher education also have an active competition with each other. Thus, students within the system, professors, alumni, current board members (and the various public segments themselves-- university, state college and community college systems) also comprised what could be classified as outside forces as the Commission prepared for action.

The Board of Higher Education, the Executive Office of Educational Affairs, and the Board of Education would also have to be considered as outside forces. Any study by the Special Commission would probably evaluate the roles that these agencies play. Insofar as these offices all came about as a result of the last major reorganization within Massachusetts, the Willis-Harrington Study and Report¹⁴, all probably viewed the Commission as a possible agent of their own demise.

Representatives of the media would certainly find themselves classified as outside forces also. Their portrayal of the activities of the Commission would provide a critical interface between the Commission and the world at large.

One of the most critical outside forces was time. Although there seemed to be an abundance of that commodity at the outset of the Commission's work, that situation did not persist as the work of the Commission wore on.

There is no argument which would negate the fact that

the Special Commission had a tremendous potential. As this dissertation progresses, it will be made apparent what the true contributions of the Commission were.

My direct approach in preparing this case study of the activities of the Special Commission on Reorganization has consisted, and will consist, of the following:

1. Attendance at Commission and subgroup meetings.
2. Discussions with executive director and staff members of Special Commission.
3. Discussions with members of Special Commission.
4. Review of notes, minutes, cassette recordings and paper output of Commission and subgroups.
5. Review of work of previous Special Commission on Reorganization, and review of all previous reorganization plans.
6. Discussions with various members of the legislature.
7. Study of Commonwealth budgetary materials covering the last several years.
8. Study of current educational institutions in the Commonwealth and the workings of the systems to which they belong.
9. Study of the Massachusetts position in comparison to the other forty-nine states relative to the magnitude of funding of public higher education.
10. Vast amount of reading on many subjects including

governance, budget, reorganization methods, power, management practices, marketing and many, many others.

The author asks the reader to note the following points.

The terms Commission, Special Commission and Special Commission on Reorganization will be used throughout the dissertation to represent the Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education. The term full Commission will be employed to distinguish the main body from either the Boston subgroup or the Governance subgroup.

The term House will be considered synonymous with the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and the term Senate will be considered synonymous with the Massachusetts Senate.

The term Governor, unless otherwise designated, will apply to Edward J. King.

Finally, the term Commonwealth will be synonymous only with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in this dissertation.

C H A P T E R I I

FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION: THE INITIAL MEETING

On June 26, 1979, provision was made (through a legislative resolution)¹⁵ for a Special Commission to investigate and study matters relative to the evaluation and reorganization of public higher education in the Commonwealth. Of great interest to me was the stated need within the resolve for "improving the structure of public higher education in the Commonwealth."¹⁶ The resolve also set a mandatory date for the receipt of the Commission's first report. Drafts of possible legislation which would emanate from the Special Commission were to accompany the first report.

The date of filing was set for December 5, 1979. Unfortunately, the first meeting of the Special Commission took place on November 14, 1979, some 141 days after the passage of the resolution, and only 21 days before the mandated initial report. As a matter of fact, the first interim report of the Special Commission was given a publication date of June 30, 1980. (Some legislation resulting from the Commission's work was produced in late spring, 1980). This procrastination inherent in the late start established a beginning of the Commission that was marred by the lateness. If every available day of the Commission's possible life had been utilized from the beginning of eligible time (June 26, 1979) until the actual end (June 11, 1980)

the Commission could have had a working life of 351 days instead of 210. It is most interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the Commission met for the additional days.

The chief reason for the late start should probably be attributed to the failure of the Commonwealth's chief executive, Governor King, to make the majority of his ten appointments until October 12, 1979. This delay was the chief reason accompanying other circumstances regarding the late start which cost the Commission an increase of up to sixty-seven percent in working time.

The late appointments of the Governor were further compounded by the fact that of the original ten appointed by the Governor, three failed to compile positive attendance records.

One never appeared, and was replaced in January, 1980; one attended four meetings (the last one was February 21, 1980) and was replaced in May, 1980; one never appeared, and was never replaced (thus causing a complete gap of one possible spot).

The backgrounds of the gubernatorial appointees are interesting to peruse. Some backgrounds indicated great potential strength for the Commission.

The Honorable Foster Furcolo had served as Governor of the Commonwealth from 1957 - 1961, and is regarded by many as being the father of the community college system in

Massachusetts.

George Hazzard had served as president of one of the top private engineering schools in the East, (Worcester Polytechnic Institute). The Honorable John Collins had served as Mayor of Boston, and James Hammond was appointed to serve on the 1979 Commission while concurrently serving as Chancellor of the Massachusetts State College system.

Only one gubernatorial appointment to this Commission had served on the previous Commission (formed in 1977) as well. Dr. Francis Sherry was not an original appointee to the 1977 Commission, but was named by Governor Dukakis to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of James Bailey.

Eight House members and four Senate members serving on the 1979 Commission had also served on the 1977 Commission.¹⁷ Thus, the legislative members were well acquainted with the Special Commission's purpose.

The Commission staff members appeared to be well chosen for the task ahead.

Richard Hailer, Executive Director, had been interviewed by the previous Special Commission, and had formerly served as Assistant Secretary of Educational Affairs in Massachusetts. A former Director in the United States Peace Corps, Richard exhibited a great deal of serenity throughout the entire life of the Commission, and probably could be correctly deemed one of the most stabilizing influences during the period November, 1979 to June, 1980.

Two of the other staff members had also worked for the previous Special Commission, and all of the additional staff had previously been employed by, or served on, at least one Commonwealth board or agency, so the apparent level of expertise among the staff was high.

A great deal of practical experience was brought to the Commission by the presence of Laura Clausen, Gregory Anrig and Charles Johnson, the ex officio members.

(A list of the regular and ex officio members of the 1979 Commission, their titles (if applicable) and their lengths of service will be found in Appendix B).

At this point in time, in spite of the lateness of the appointments, and the resulting terrible time lag between the potential beginning of the Commission and the actual inception, it would seem to the casual observer that the Commission might still have a chance of success.

However, it sometimes seems that previous experiences leave lasting impressions. All levels of this present Special Commission (staff, gubernatorial appointments, legislative appointments) had at least one member who was affiliated with the previous Special Commission. Therefore, before examining the record of the current Special Commission, it would be wise to examine the record of the previous Special Commission to determine what the circumstances of its existence had been. An exhaustive search for official minutes produced little result. The only available record

of the previous Commission was located in the office of the current Commission. According to those records, the 1977 Special Commission held only three full meetings in 1978. (The current Commission would hold eleven full Commission meetings and eighteen subgroup meetings).

The first two meetings in 1978 of the previous Special Commission were roughly four months apart, with the first one taking place in May.

The second meeting, on September 13, 1978, found two major items put into action.

First, the full Commission, at the request of Rep. James Collins (Amherst), voted to form an executive committee.¹⁸

Second, the executive committee was given two charges:

1. Prepare with the assistance of staff a document describing the status of public higher education, and mail to all Commission members for their review prior to the Commission meeting of November 14, 1978.
2. Lay the groundwork for the job description of an executive director to be employed by the Commission.

At the November 14, 1978 meeting of the full Commission (the last full meeting of this Commission, incidentally), no mention was made in the minutes of the meeting about any document related to the then current status of public higher education.

Instead, the executive committee reported that they

had met, formed a job description for the position of executive director, and had posted that job description. It was noted that approximately 130 applications had been received. The Commission wanted to hire an executive director, and asked that ten finalists be submitted to it.

Although the executive committee met several more times, nothing came to fruition as a result of its work, and the efforts of the 1977 Special Commission ended without ceremony or completion.

The overall record of the previous Special Commission was not impressive by any standards. And, in light of the quantity of members and staff serving on the current Special Commission who served on or with the previous one (at least fifteen people are involved--if one counts those as well with some limited interaction relative to the previous Commission, the total number gets close to twenty) it is important here to note the following:

1. Senator Boverini, Chairman of the current Special Commission, also served as Chairman of the previous one.
2. Four members of the Senate and eight members of the House, serving on the present Special Commission, also served on the previous Commission.
3. Two staff members of the present Commission served for the previous Commission.
4. The Governor was tardy in making his appointments

to the Commission.

Even prior to the first meeting of the current Special Commission, rumblings protesting reorganization were heard, and, on other fronts, reorganization was being called for.

Many people felt that the thrust of public higher education within Massachusetts lacked direction and coordination, and these same people felt that public higher education lacked overall coordination.

Special examples of items which were drawing the ire of many included poorly constructed college and university buildings, and charges of incorrect use of discretionary funds by some of the presidents in the state college system.

For instance, on June 21, 1979, the state college presidents came under a great deal of fire from the Massachusetts Legislative Committee on Post Audit and Oversight for "wrong" use of discretionary funds.¹⁹

Then, approximately a month before the first meeting of the Special Commission, the library at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, began to shed its bricks, resulting in a temporary closing of the library. Even though the reason causing closing was not primarily a function of the University, the incident again found people looking critically at another example of failure in what people loosely called higher education.²⁰

Conversely, and interestingly, at its August 29, 1979 meeting, the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees

voted to strongly support the status quo of its operations, and took the occasion to warn against any severance and/or isolation of the Boston Campus from the University. (The entire text is found in Appendix C.)

A close neighbor of Massachusetts, Connecticut, was also doing a public higher education reorganization plan at the same time as Massachusetts. The Connecticut Board of Higher Education, under pressure from its legislature to present a reorganization plan, planned to act on several drastic and major reorganization changes within the state.²¹

Many in Massachusetts, including some legislators, expressed great interest in the Connecticut study.

A quote from The Emerging State College seemed to correctly refer to a condition which many people suspected was rampant in Massachusetts. "...if higher institutions of a system are permitted to develop without overall coordination, the tendency is for various institutions to compete for students, to duplicate expensive programs, and to incur unnecessary building and campus expenses."²²

The Special Commission members would find themselves studying many reorganization proposals that had been introduced over the last few years. None had ever been put into practice, and they all enjoyed another common factor as well. All proposals called for major changes in Massachusetts higher education. Obviously, all of the proposals reflected a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo of

current systems.

Senate Bill 1371, introduced by Kevin Harrington in 1976, called for the formation of a twenty-eight member board of trustees to run the college and university system of Massachusetts.²³ Under this proposal, the board of trustees would have disbursing power of all system monies, and all existing segments would merge into one. A post secondary education commission would work with the board of trustees, and would in effect, become the equivalent of an accreditation agency of state government.

Harrington's plans called for five university centers, and gave the board of trustees complete autonomy to manipulate funding. In addition, the Board of Higher Education was to be absorbed by the post secondary education commission. The proposed measure, as submitted by Harrington, also allowed for student and faculty representation on individual institutional councils.

House Bill 5756, first submitted to the legislature by Governor Dukakis in April 1977, also proposed to abolish the Board of Higher Education, suggested a Board of Overseers which contained among other members the Massachusetts Secretary of Education and allowed for Advisory Commissions.²⁴ A later version of the Dukakis Bill (by Secretary Parks) suggested regional organization under a central Board of Overseers.²⁵

Kermit Morrissey, as President of Boston State College,

in 1977 proposed that a single Board of Regents of twenty-one members replace all present governing boards and the Board of Higher Education. Morrissey proposed that the state colleges stand alone.²⁶

The fourth and last proposal that I will refer to here is the Board of Higher Education proposal of August 31, 1979.²⁷

Under that proposal's direction, there would be six separate boards under the supervision of a strengthened Board of Higher Education, and the office of Executive Secretary of Education would be abolished.

The dissertation will illustrate the intrinsic difficulty that the members of the Commission experienced in attempting to assimilate the above information.

Obviously, it was to prove just as difficult for the Commission's staff to find the best manner of presenting this voluminous material to the Commission.

This chapter will end with a survey of the first meeting of the Special Commission. The meeting was held on November 14, 1979. The date was especially meaningful, because it marked the span of exactly one year from the date of the third and final full Commission meeting of the previous Special Commission.

The Senate members had the best attendance record for the first meeting, with all members from that body present.

The House of Representatives delegation produced an eighty percent attendance rate and three out of ten gubernatorial appointees were missing.

The first meeting was fairly promising. The action of the Commission resulted in Senator Walter Boverini being elected Chairman, and Representative Frank Matrango being elected Co-Chairman.

Then, in a move which allowed for integration of the previous Special Commission's work, Richard Hailer was appointed Executive Director of the Special Commission.

Finally, it was agreed that objectives dealing with a final report of the Commission should be clearly delineated.

Before the first meeting adjourned, it was agreed that heads of the various segments were to be invited to attend future meetings in order to explain missions and goals of their individual segments, both current and futuristic.

The next chapter will record the progress of the Commission through its next twenty-eight meetings.

C H A P T E R I I I
PRESENTATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

Any study of the Special Commission must not only concentrate on the Commission's efforts and accomplishments, but also on the number of meetings that took place, and their frequency, and the results of those meetings.

To show part of what I am referring to, the full Commission met six times between November 14, 1979 and February 14, 1980. The shortest period of time between any two consecutive meetings was ten days. The longest period of time between any two consecutive meetings was twenty-eight days.

From February 14, 1980 to June 11, 1980, the Commission met as a full group only five times, and in all but one case, there was almost a gap of one month between consecutive full Commission meetings.

It should be noted, in all fairness, that some eighteen subgroup meetings were held, but I could not help looking back at the dismal record of the previous Commission, and noting the fact that according to available records that I could find, only three full meetings were ever held by that body, and everything else was directed to an executive committee subgroup. (A member of the 1977 Special Commission told me in 1978 (September) that that person felt that the progress of the Commission was critically slow, and even

expressed doubt that the leadership of the Commission had actually wanted to get anything done.) Perusal of the record of the 1977 Commission tends to bear out that doubt of the 1977 Commission member.

However, the status of the Special Commission as of December 6, 1979 appeared (on the surface, anyway) to be cause for optimism. A course of action had been formed, and a schedule was in the process of being formed whereby the heads of segments and agencies would define the mission of their segments and agencies for the members of the Special Commission.

Prior to describing these special presentations in specific terms, I will give an overview of the total presentations.

First, no segmental or agency presentation was as complete, as effective or as penetrating as it could or should have been. Most of the presentations were made in a way that suggested deep servitude to the Commission, a lack of faith in what was being said, no ability to dominate the atmosphere of the occasion, and an extremely defensive attitude.

Obviously, the attitude, the posture, and what the U.S. Marine Corps called "presence" can make a decided difference in the overall assessment of how a Special Commission will regard representatives of components of an educational system. My impressions after observing the presentations

to the Special Commission led me to believe that the Special Commission members were not impressed or enthralled with most of the presidential deliveries.

To digress for a moment, I feel that public higher education in Massachusetts has suffered for many years because the hierarchy of the segments was reluctant to take an active role in telling the legislature what was needed (really needed) to effectively maintain and improve our system of public higher education in the Commonwealth.

Abbs and Carey take the view that there is a vast difference between a university president who is keenly aware of a state legislature, and one who lets the state legislature run the ship.²⁸ It's quite apparent that few presidents within the system have the clout to actively engage in a battle with the legislature. (One of the exceptions to that statement could be the current president of Holyoke Community College).²⁹

Abbs and Carey also state that a leader does not just minister to organizational equilibrium, but gives specific direction.³⁰ Little if any direction was exhibited by the presidents and other presenters before the Special Commission. A lack of direction at the hearings might indicate that it is not present otherwise.

The mechanics of the presentations may be summarized as follows:

1. Main speaker appeared with one or more colleagues

before the Special Commission.

2. A fact book concerning the institution/system was prepared for the occasion and distributed.

3. Remarks were made by the president and/or colleagues.

4. Visual presentations were made to augment the speaker's material.

5. Questions from the Commission members were answered.

The presentations were subject to physical and psychological constraints.

It was difficult because of some room layouts for the presenters to even establish or maintain good eye contact with the Commission members. The lighting arrangements were most difficult, the slide shows were not able to be shown with maximum clarity, and the images themselves were often keystoneed as well.

It is no wonder that after all presentations were delivered a general feeling of relief seemed to pervade the room.

However, it would have been possible (with some adequate planning) to overcome some of the inherent space problems. David Schuman's axiom (repeated in lectures and books) that "If you make the rules you win the game" would be well used as a daily reminder by those who have to make presentations.³¹

Of even more importance is the question-- What good did these presentations do the Commission?

The presentations of the segments of higher education, the Executive Office of Educational Affairs and the Board of Higher Education took about a total of fifteen hours of the Commission's time, and, in a linear time frame, were given over a time span of seventy days.

So, after ninety-two days of potential activity, the Commission had met six times, elected a Chairman and Co-Chairman, elected an Executive Director, arranged for visits by segmental and agency heads, and listened to (and watched) the representatives of the Board of Higher Education, the Executive Office of Educational Affairs, the Massachusetts State College System, The Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, Southeastern Massachusetts University, University of Lowell and the University of Massachusetts.

The presentations deserve examination, even though the format was pretty universal. All extolled the virtues of the respective systems, and all lamented what couldn't be done because of lack of money.

The presentations of Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education Laura Clausen, and of Educational Affairs Secretary Charles M. Johnson were given with full knowledge that several reorganization proposals over the last few years have suggested the ouster of both agencies. The current time frame was no exception.

The presentation of the State College System took on a slightly different approach because the presenter, Chancellor Hammond, was also a gubernatorial appointee to the Commission. (No matter how objective Chancellor Hammond was capable of being, and no matter how pure his intentions, his participation as a presenter was marred because of his involvement with the segment coupled with his membership on the Commission. It was a most untenable situation for the Chancellor, and a poor situation for the Commission.)

Although planning was alluded to in most presentations, none utilized it as a subject more than the presentation of Laura Clausen, Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education. However, the need for long range planning never became too serious a subject for the Special Commission until near the end of its deliberations in May and June, 1980.

In contrast to the light treatment accorded planning by the Special Commission much has been written on the subject by writers of public higher education policy and practices. Some excerpts are listed here.

In the book Public Financing of Higher Education, the Tax Foundation directors feel that institutions should develop master plans based on regional as well as state needs,³² and Palola suggests planning ranges of 1-4 years, 5-25 years and 26-50 years.³³

But, it's tough to implement a master plan even if it's possible to write one.

Etzioni, in 1968, pointed out that "fifteen and ten years ago underdeveloped countries were formulating master plans for their modernization. Fewer than one out of ten were implemented even in part."³⁴

Master plans are easily violated, also. After the occasion of a master plan in education for North Carolina was short-circuited by political connection, one college president in that state said: "The whole master plan is going to be useless if it is clear that educational issues are settled in the state legislature by the political process."³⁵

Finally, a master plan should not be viewed as a means of saving money, but, rather, as pointed out in Berdahl, it may be a means of increasing expenditures "...because of bringing together needs in a clear comprehensive whole."³⁶

The new year officially opened for the Commission with a meeting which featured a presentation of data concerning the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges. The presenters were both former legislators. John Buckley, interim president of the community college system, gave a soft sell approach which quietly extolled the advantages of the community college systems. David Bartley, President of Holyoke Community College, followed with a hard sell approach relative to the economic linkages of community colleges with their surrounding communities. This observer noted the uncommonly warm reception that these two presidents

received from the legislators present, and both (especially President Bartley) basked in the situation which allowed them to make their presentations in very familiar surroundings. No other president or presenter fared as well. It was prophetic because the old saying that "The legislature takes care of its own" seemed to be working, a grim reminder that this Special Commission was operating within a system controlled by the legislature.

Four days after the Buckley-Bartley presentation, the Boston Globe's Muriel Cohen wrote a comprehensive article regarding the consolidation of Boston public colleges, and the headline stated that it was considered "inevitable" by some. (The outside forces were beginning to move.)³⁷

The meeting of January 14, 1980 dealt with many subjects, and for the first twenty-five minutes was a rambling affair. After mention and discussion of several subjects such as building authorities, elimination of programs, curriculum and evaluation of institutions, Mayor Collins cautioned that the Commission not go in too many directions. Dr. Sherry spoke up strongly in favor of subcommittees. Senator D'Amico, in a prophetic move, suggested that the Commission deal with Boston first. Discussion followed on whether to take Boston first or not. At this point the Committee moved into action, and began to talk about the Boston situation.

Senator Boverini cautioned the Commission that if they

don't do Boston, people might say that they were ducking it, and questioned if people might say that Finnegan, McGee, Bulger and Atkins can reorganize without the Commission.³⁸

The rest of the meeting dealt with "getting the Commission's act together," basically by agreeing to set up subcommittees, and going in what the Commission members and staff felt was a positive direction.

The meeting closed with three items that deserve recording.

1. Dr. Hazzard and Mayor Collins urged the Commission to move with greater speed.
2. Chairman Boverini stated to the Commission that even though he had been asked if the Commission could meet every week, he had many other meetings to attend dealing with many other subjects.
3. Again, Senator Boverini (along with Representative James Collins and Senator D'Amico) stated that if this Commission doesn't do something with Boston, someone will.

On the evening of January 14, 1980, Governor Edward J. King delivered his annual State Address, and the following items within his speech were of particular interest.

"Of particular importance is reform of our Civil Service system and elimination of waste and duplication in our state colleges and universities. Two Special Commissions are now reviewing these problems. (Next paragraph from

original text has been omitted.)

Our public colleges have a tradition of academic excellence. We shall maintain this tradition, but in a way which both student and taxpayers can afford.

We urge each Commission to report its findings and file legislation for action in this year's legislative session."³⁹

The Governor's request could not be misinterpreted. It was a call for quick action. The same request had been made that afternoon by Commission members Hazzard and Collins (John). Up to this point, the requests/admonitions were ignored.

The last two meetings at which presentations were given (Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University of Lowell on 1/24/80 and University of Massachusetts on 2/14/80) were not marked by any noticeable changes from the first presentation.

Between the two meetings, however, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman John Finnegan publicly stated, "It's clear we have more physical facilities for higher education than we need."⁴⁰ Again, Chairman Finnegan was showing that his assault on public higher education was serious, and he showed that he was unafraid to send barbed messages into the "enemy camp." A serious condition existed which the Commission members largely chose to ignore -- Finnegan's remarks caused consternation among the Commission's members, but the Commission's activities didn't seem to be

bothering Chairman Finnegan at all. It raised serious questions. Who was really in charge? Who had the clout?

Of all the presentation meetings, the last one (February 14) was the most important, for it was at that meeting that several important things occurred.

1. Janet Robinson was appointed to the Commission to replace Wayne Budd.
2. Former Governor Foster Furcolo submitted a re-organization plan of his own to the Commission.
3. A Boston subcommittee was formed, and the young and enterprising Senator from Worcester, Gerard D'Amico, was named Chairman.
4. A Governance subcommittee was formed, and Dr. Francis Sherry was named Chairman.

This meeting closed with an upbeat feeling among the participants, but two warnings of caution were given by Chairman Boverini. He suggested a close relationship between the Commission, the legislature and the Governor, and he again reiterated what had been said a couple of meetings before-- "If we don't do it (the entire reorganization package) it's going to be done."

In the first part of his remarks, at the end of the meeting, Chairman Boverini might well have been referring to a quote that appeared in Berdahl's book on statewide planning stating that any growth of cooperation between higher education and government will depend on the avail-

ability of a mechanism to encourage cooperation.⁴¹ Unfortunately, the record will show that no real linkage was ever established by the Commission with the legislature--a deadly mistake.

The second part of the Chairman's statement only bore out what he and others had succinctly stated before. Plenty of enemies existed in outside forces, and they meant business.

C H A P T E R I V

NEW DIRECTIONS

This chapter will cover the total time span measured from February 21, 1980 until March 27, 1980. However, in order for me to effectively document the work of the newly formed subgroups, and at the same time relate it to the work of the full Commission, I shall refer to three separate time spans as listed below:

Span I February 21, 1980 to March 6, 1980

Span II March 13, 1980 (morning and afternoon).

Span III March 20, 1980 to March 27, 1980

Obviously, the Commission staff was at work for more than the listed dates above, but I am using the dates of meetings as benchmarks for the three time spans.

Before embarking on a study of the specific time spans, I would like to interject a summary that could be of interest to the reader. As of the date of the last meeting of the Commission (February 14, 1980), the Commission had completed its ninety-second day, and had met as a group for a total of approximately twenty hours. This works out to about an average of thirteen minutes per day. Common practice indicates that any project normally exerts a tremendous amount of excitement at the beginning of the endeavor. However, no

welling of excitement seemed to be taking place among the Commission members. The reader will recall that in Chapter III I cited the failure of Chairman Boverini to want to meet on a weekly basis. The implication of that attitude was now beginning to take on a great importance. Meanwhile, people on the outside watched...and waited.

Time Span I

The newly formed Governance committee met on February 21, 1980. The first impression one would have felt at that first Governance meeting was that much time remained to make decisions. The initial pace of the meeting was slow, and it was indicated that "at some point" the Commission wants to talk to national experts.⁴² The feeling of ample time prevailed.

During the discussion, Governor Foster Furcolo made me listen carefully when he qualified a statement with, "...when the time comes if we ever get to the point of making final recommendations...". And, Representative William Mullins expressed anger and frustration during this meeting, saying "We're spinning our wheels. Where the hell are we going?"

These were early signs that the Commission was not going to find its task easy. This was the ninety-ninth day of the Commission's existence, and it was apparent that no

clear direction was being pointed out by the leadership.

During this first Governance meeting, Dr. Sherry attempted to exert moderate control over the pace and content of the meeting.

However, the meeting was managed, to a great extent, by the input of Laura Clausen, Gregory Anrig and Arnold Friedman. Additionally, William Mullins kept inserting reflections upon the quality of effort and work of the trustees of public higher education. Representative Mullins blasted the past role of some trustees, and especially some former trustees of Westfield State College.⁴³

Other suggestions were made during the meeting, and while all were positive they served to keep the Commission at a standstill while all were being considered. Some of the suggestions offered are listed below.

1. Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education Laura Clausen urged that the subgroup list objectives.

(Again, I point out that this suggestion was made on the ninety-ninth day of the Commission's existence. The reader will recall reading in Chapter II that a call was given to formulate objectives governing the final report of the Commission. As far as I knew ninety-nine days after that first meeting, those requested items had not been produced. Now, here was the same call being given again).

2. Commissioner of Education Gregory Anrig suggested

that a summary of all reorganization proposals be made, and that the Governance subgroup focus on the differences between and among the proposals.

3. Arnold Friedman made the suggestion that the subgroup meet with faculty and students, and wanted to know why all of public higher education is not being coordinated together instead of the present system of competition among segments.

The meeting closed on one positive note as well as a recurring frightening one.

First, some agreement finally surfaced when Governance committee members agreed to study reorganization proposals for the next meeting, and, after discussion, to give consideration to evaluating the Board of Higher Education and Secretary of Education as well as agreeing to bring in some "experts" to aid the Governance subcommittee.

Second, and probably more important, a state of reality was again stressed by Commission Chairman Walter Boverini when he told the Commission members on the Governance subcommittee that something is going to happen from within (the Commission)⁴⁴ or without. Both Senator Boverini and Representative Mullins cautioned their Governance committee colleagues not to underestimate the power of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees.

A week after the initial meeting of the Governance subcommittee, Chairman Gerard D'Amico met on February 28,

1980 for the first time with members of the Boston sub-committee. Six Boston centers of public higher education were represented at this meeting, and the head of each institution reacted as one would expect. Certainly, the majority of the six heads were not too happy to speak of specific merger plans.⁴⁵

Although Kermit Morrissey, the President of Boston State College soon would be leaving that post to become Assistant to Human Services Secretary Charles Mahoney, he testified relative to reorganization of public higher education. His stated preference was to have a statewide reorganization take place first, and then have a Boston reorganization take place.

Other comments from the assembled presidents were quite parochial.

President Shiveley of Bunker Hill Community College extolled the virtues of Bunker Hill's Learning Center, terming it the "most extensive teaching-learning center in this country." His colleague, President Haskins of Roxbury Community College launched a heated attack on remaining color policies within the Commonwealth, and, in a statement backed up by statements from Representative Mel King, said that his facilities needed better access as well as improvement because his people were poor.

President McKenzie of Massachusetts Bay Community College praised the role of his institution, and sounded in

no way receptive to any proposed merger.

President Nolan of the Massachusetts College of Art also expressed resistance to reorganization when he called for the preservation of the independence of the Massachusetts College of Art, and the need for separate laboratory facilities.

The only two presidents who discussed any merger plans on any type of a positive note were President Morrissey and Chancellor Corrigan, with Morrissey suggesting a merger of University of Massachusetts/Boston State and Massachusetts College of Art--and Corrigan stating that any merger has to be approached cautiously.

Representative James Collins queried the presidents about the possible savings to be gained by consolidation. Almost all the presidents responded in a highly ferocious (but civilized) manner that money is important, but should not be the main question.

Senator D'Amico interjected, at this point, a statement offering opportunities for massive input to the Boston subgroup and emphasized the importance of bringing all facts about Boston forward so that full disclosure can ensue.

D'Amico was pleased to suggest that this Boston subcommittee forum provided an excellent opportunity for constituency groups to make their feelings known to the Commission.

D'Amico strongly stated that we (the Commission)⁴⁶ are

prepared to reject any attempt at any level to circumvent the work of this subgroup until as much data as possible has been collected. I feel positive that this statement was made with less actual certainty than was implied. Senator D'Amico had to know what was happening with outside forces, and so this statement was unnecessary.

Another false note of optimism was introduced by Representative James Collins. He seemed to think that the work of the Boston committee would be quick to bring to finality, because he indicated in his remarks that in terms of a final report, "maybe in a month." it's important to get a big picture of what's going on in Boston.

The meeting closed on a positive note.

A motion was passed to visit all Boston campuses within the month of March.

Commission Executive Director Richard Hailer exhorted the Commission to ask only important questions on their visits.

And, in a concession to Dr. Hazzard's zeal for moving right along, Senator D'Amico noted that "President Hazzard keeps us on the move."⁴⁷ It is important to note yet another warning from Dr. Hazzard.

The Boston subgroup held one more meeting (March 6, 1980) prior to the full Commission meeting of March 13th. Two community colleges were toured, Roxbury and Bunker Hill. Both visits allowed student, faculty and administrative

leaders to plead for their respective colleges. At Roxbury, Representative Mel King decried the political aura surrounding any decision regarding Roxbury Community College. However, no novel ideas were generated at either site, so the most obvious advantage of the Commission visit was to gain insight into what Bunker Hill and Roxbury were like.

Time Span II

The seventh full Commission meeting of the Special Commission was held on March 13, 1980 at the University of Massachusetts/Boston. Only six members of the Commission plus the Commissioner of Education, his deputy and the Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education were in attendance for this meeting. A seventh member of the Commission appeared less than thirty seconds before the end of the meeting, although he was later listed as present.

The mood of the meeting could be described as both lighthearted and apprehensive at the same time. The apprehensiveness came about because of the rumor that a number of students were going to stage a march that day, and some members of the Commission felt that their meeting would become one of the stopping points of the students. The lightheartedness sprang from the conduct of the meeting. Early in the meeting, Commission member Arnold Friedman asked if there were any cooperation among the segmental

building authorities, State College System and State College Building Authority. Trustee John Cataldo replied that there was as much cooperation among segmental building authorities as there was among trustees. This answer drew a big laugh.

The mood prevailed throughout the testimony of Messrs. Cataldo and Stuart,⁴⁸ and probably accounted for the lack of substantive questions asked of the two gentlemen.

The Dover Project⁴⁹ was brought up by Mr. Friedman, but any serious inquiry into the full nature and philosophy of the project never materialized.

A planned appearance by a Harvard professor, who had been scheduled to speak on the subject of enrollment projections, never materialized.⁵⁰

While the meeting moved at a very slow pace to completion, two reports were presented to the Commission. Dr. Francis Sherry reported on the progress of the Governance subgroup, and promised that everyone would have input. Senator D'Amico reported on the progress of the Boston subgroup, and repeated the intention of the committee to visit all six Boston public higher education campuses.⁵¹

The meeting finally started to steer in a fairly serious direction when Executive Director Richard Hailer took the occasion to mention key areas for the Commission's consideration:

Energy

Financial Aid

Capital Outlay

Student Services

Five-Year Plan

Richard Hailer also mentioned that the staff members were getting phone calls telling them to expedite the process. (No identities of the callers were disclosed.)

During the discussion led by Dr. Hailer, Chancellor Clausen stated that she hoped to be able to refine data on population projections by May, 1980. This would prove to be a date too late for all practical purposes.

The importance of timely planning was accentuated when Arnold Friedman, on this 120th day of the Commission's existence, asked for information about other state systems. The reply was made by Dr. Hailer that only partial reports were available.

Mr. Friedman (with the agreement of Drs. Sherry and Hazzard), stated that he felt that the Commission was getting into the study of too many intricate details. Both he and Senator Olver requested information on what other states were doing.

The meeting ended inauspiciously.

On the afternoon of March 13, 1980, the Boston subgroup held its scheduled meeting at the Harbor Campus of the University of Massachusetts. Chancellor Robert Corrigan and President David Knapp led the delegation of University of Massachusetts/Boston faculty and administrators who were

present to provide information. As he did in the first Boston subgroup meeting, Chancellor Corrigan emphasized that merger of some Boston institutions could be a possibility. Other members of the administration, faculty, staff and students contributed items to the Commission members.

Throughout the first part of the meeting, the shouts of marching and protesting students could be heard, and it was evident by the sudden appearance of what seemed to be security personnel that some students wanted access to the meeting and to the Commission, and that access was not to be granted easily or immediately.

Finally, in a move that could have (and should have) been granted immediately, the students who had participated in the march were allowed to speak to the Commission. Their subject was a plea for increased quality of Commonwealth education. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to specific admissions data pertinent to Boston State and the University of Massachusetts/Boston.

The meeting ended on the afternoon of the 120th day. The Commission did not know it, but only ninety days of meaningful existence were left for it.

Time Span III

Additional meetings of the Boston subgroup and Governance subgroup were held in March, 1980.

The March 20, 1980 meeting of the Boston group was held at Boston State College, and the thoroughness of preparation by Boston State for the Commission visit matched the thoroughness of the Boston State College President's Report mentioned in Chapter II.⁵² The meeting provided a forum which allowed expansion of the college traits first presented at the initial Boston subgroup meeting.

Dr. Rothermel, a Boston State faculty member,⁵³ began the forum by noting demographic facts unique to Boston State, such as the fact that about half of the students at Boston State apply only to that institution, and almost half of the students come right from Boston. He was followed by other speakers who spoke on specific college programs, including cooperative education⁵⁴ and teacher education, including involvement in the National Teacher Corps program.

Dr. Carl Cedargren⁵⁵ blasted the unfounded statements that have been cited relative to Boston State. He bemoaned the situation that would occur if Boston State were eliminated, such as the probable loss of the opportunity for thousands of students to attend a four-year college. Dr. Cedargren took great umbrage at the proliferation of apparent facts generated by UMass/Boston in an attempt to show that UMass/Boston could absorb Boston State. Dr. Cedargren closed his remarks with the suggestion that UMass/Boston be absorbed by the State College System, using differences in per student cost as one aspect of his assertion.⁵⁶

Near the end of the meeting Senator D'Amico told the assemblage that his subgroup would be back to Boston State.

A particularly significant moment was reached during the proceedings when subgroup Chairman Senator D'Amico was asked by a member of the audience if the full Commission could override the recommendations of the Boston subgroup. Senator D'Amico replied in the affirmative, and further indicated, in a very prophetic way, that the General Court could if it wished, override the recommendations of the full Commission.

The meeting closed with many impassioned pleas to leave Boston State College as it was.

The same day found the Governance subgroup meeting also. It was the second meeting for the group, and marked the end of a period of thirty days since that group's first meeting.

During the time between meetings, Commission subgroup members had been expected to read and evaluate various reorganization proposals that had been presented for their review. Janet Slovin was asked to review the proposals (listed in Appendix D) for the Governance group. Much of the meeting was redundant in that the self-study material assigned the Commission members was really only repeated in its original form during the afternoon.

In my opinion, much of the time of this meeting could have been spent more wisely.

The material for discussion could have been organized much more succinctly; in fact, had the material been prepared for discussion in a much better and more organized fashion, it might have been possible to give this material to Commission members so that the material was clearly understandable in its printed form.

But, that was not done. Instead, much of the valuable time of the Commission was taken by participation in a poorly organized session.

The course of the meeting was choppy, with much darting back and forth from subject to subject.

It seemed to be a situation where the main theme of the Commission kept being diverted into small and tenuous channels.

The meeting closed with a discussion of budget processes and fiscal autonomy.

The reader will remember that I cited the vast importance of the legislature-controlled budget in the Introduction to this dissertation. At that point in the dissertation, I pointed out that budgets created philosophies--and, some of the philosophies created problems.

(As I observed the Commission at work, I really had no assurance that all of the members really understood budgets. Hundreds of volumes have been written about budgets and budget processes. I felt that required reading for the Commission should have been Wildavsky's text The

Politics of the Budgetary Process.⁵⁷ However, the Commission never dug too thoroughly into the subject of budgets, nor did they ever really address the fundamental aspects of fiscal autonomy.)

Appendix E contains some goals and objectives for the Governance subgroup.

The 134th day of the Commission's life saw the Boston subgroup hold its fourth March meeting at a double location--Massachusetts College of Art, and Massachusetts Bay Community College.

The visit to the Massachusetts College of Art drew attention to the singularity of the institution, and many students gave impassioned pleas for the preservation of the school.

In my opinion, Representative Mel King contributed the only item which made the meeting worthwhile, the only criterion for the Commission to use in laying out the future of higher education, in spite of pressure from the Governor and legislature to save money and consolidate. He urged the students at Massachusetts College of Art to mobilize all the students in Boston in order to impress the Commission and the Governor and the legislature with the importance of the need to preserve quality education and unique education in Boston.

When the group visited Massachusetts Bay Community College, Senator D'Amico broached the proposal of a greater

Boston Community College--one that would have several campuses. The reaction to his suggestion was less than positive. This suggestion only proved to be one more thing to keep many public higher education members from supporting the Boston subgroup or the full Commission.

During the meeting Senator D'Amico stressed that he was subjected to forces all the time urging consolidation of the present behemoths of the public higher education system in Massachusetts.

He claimed that the Senate Ways and Means Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, Governor, and many newspaper writers and editors were taking up the banner for consolidation.

The general tone of the meeting described Massachusetts Bay Community College as a unique place to provide the services which it was able to provide.

President McKenzie chided the members of the Boston subgroup who were absent, and strongly urged that the governance of the entire state be worked out prior to the Boston reorganization.

Summary of visitations:

All of the visitations were conducted by the members of the subgroup in a slightly defensive manner, and in a couple of instances the manner was quite defensive.

The quantity of representation of the Boston subgroup was never what it should have been at any one meeting.

Most of the visitations consisted of a tour, and then a dialogue between the Commission and the members of the host institution.

The majority of dialogue generally consisted of parochial arguments why the respective institutions being visited should not be closed, or merged with others.

Senator D'Amico, who chaired all of the Boston subgroup meetings, divided his time in three ways while conducting the informational meetings.

1. He alluded many times to the fact that outside forces were acting on the Commission to urge faster action, and he constantly referred to the real world political situation that was shaping the Commission's actions.

While speaking at Massachusetts Bay Community College, Senator D'Amico said that he personally preferred to move more slowly in his deliberations, but the spectre of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees caused him and the Commission to move faster than he desired.

2. He acted as the chairperson who directed activities, and spent much of his time keeping track of those who wished to speak to the Commission, and spent a great deal of time listening to those people.

3. A great deal of time was spent in explanation of why this subgroup of the Commission was looking at

the Boston situation. This put the Commission in the position of almost apologizing for its presence. Senator D'Amico's engaging manner served him in good stead during these visits, because both the people being visited and the visitors reflected a great deal of the anxiety caused by the sensation of outside forces getting ready to interfere.

C H A P T E R V

OUTSIDE FORCES INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT COMMISSION

This chapter will describe the meetings and activities of the Special Commission from April 3, 1980 to May 15, 1980, or from the 141st day to the 183rd day. The terminal date of the chapter also marks the completion of six months of official existence of the Commission.

The Special Commission was running out of time. The early delay was proving costly, more costly than anyone could have predicted, and the calendar and clock inexorably ground on. Outside forces previously alluded to grew more ominous and impatient, but the Commission continued to move at an extremely slow pace. This chapter will record some of the important (and not always beneficial events) that took place within the time frame referred to above.

1. During this time period, the replacement of the Honorable Foster Furcolo as a Commission member was effected. The resignation of Foster Furcolo represented a dramatic moment for the Commission, but most failed to realize its full implications. One of the ostensible reasons for the departure from the Commission of Governor Furcolo was that he was not able to continue on the Commission because of the strenuous demands of Commission work on his time. In actual

happening, the months of April and June, 1980 found Governor Furcolo giving most freely (and charitably) of his time to educational institutions, showing that the reason alluded to above was only an illusory one.

Certainly, an astute civil servant and realistic political figure such as Foster Furcolo probably sensed the final outcome of the Special Commission's quest long before it actually took place. My personal theory is that Governor Furcolo recognized the inevitable, and left. Events which followed seem to lend support to the theory.⁵⁸ It was a major mistake for the Commission to have set the stage for Governor Furcolo's departure. It was a huge tactical error for the Commission (and the Governor) to have let his departure go without an attempt to convince him to stay.

2. The next major event was the introduction of House 6200, the budget document of the House, with its outside language concerning reorganization. This document accentuated the checkmate-in-progress situation applied by the outside forces. Its presence quickly led to an evaluation of techniques by the Special Commission. However, no change in tactics was noticed on the Commission's part. Thus, without a countering defense by the Commission against House 6200, the onslaught of the House Bill was intensified.

3. The third major event was the visit to the Commission by Governor Edward J. King.⁵⁹ In a visit which was supposed to indicate support for the original purpose of

the Special Commission, only the most ingenuous members of the Commission could have found any hope in the Governor's message. The Governor's visit was one that the Commission would never forget. He left only devastation after his visit.

4. It had become very clear by this calendar date that the enemies of the Commission had been clearly identified. Concurrently, the course chosen by the Commission members had not produced any positive results.

a. The biggest enemy of the Commission was time.

b. The second enemy consisted of outside forces that would have been happy to supersede the Commission. Some of these forces have been identified up to this point, and others will be identified in subsequent chapters.

c. The third enemy of the Commission was...itself. I offer the identification of the third enemy not in a deprecating sense but in an objective sense. The Commission members, up to this point, had not displayed a massive show of unity. Because of this lack of cohesiveness, it made the idea of circumventing the Commission much more possible than it might have been on November 14, 1979. In addition, no major attempt had been made to link the work of the Commission to a thrust of the legislature. The Commission was, effectively, staying too inde-

pendent. Thus, without a large and powerful legislative base on friendly terms with the Commission, and without the active and full support of the House and Senate Ways and Means Chairpersons as well as the Governor, the struggle became much more difficult.

The chapter will be divided into three segments.

Span I April 3 to April 10, 1980

Span II April 17 to May 8, 1980

Span III May 13 to May 15, 1980

Time Span I

The first major item discussed at the April 3, 1980 Governance meeting was the lack of a coordinated system of collecting information relative to public higher education in Massachusetts. (There shouldn't have been a lack because current statutes do mandate the collecting of data by the Board of Higher Education. However, neither a system of collection nor funds to support that system then existed.) The topic led Arnold Friedman to call for coordination.

Dr. George Hazzard questioned the need for planning and coordination, though, when he asked what good it did to bring up those subjects for discussion when it was evident the legislature was the boss. His sentiments were echoed by Senator John Olver, who cautioned that an idealistic

system might not work, even when it was a well-planned one, because individual institutions have their champions. No answer to Dr. Hazzard's question was offered that day, but the events of June 10, 1980 provided an all-encompassing answer although a belated one.

Janet Slovin attempted to disseminate a vast quantity of information to the Commission members relative to dealing with the question of segmental representation on the board of higher education, the concept of Divisions of Continuing Education and the question of planning and program policies. In all fairness, the task was much too huge for either any one person, or the method used. Thus, the important value of information was lessened by the slow and cumbersome approach used.

During this meeting, the chairperson, Dr. Sherry, stated that the committee should have its final report by September.⁶⁰ This optimistic assumption led to two others. First, "I think it's safe to assume that the life of the Commission will continue until its work is done." Second, Dr. Sherry suggested that the Governance committee make orderly plans, using as the rationale, "We've got plenty of time."

The meeting terminated shortly afterward.

At about the same time of this April 3, 1980 Governance meeting, University of Massachusetts President David Knapp was addressing the issue of reorganization in a paper

addressed to the Long-Range Planning Committee of the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees, (and one that would be forwarded to the Special Commission if the trustees approved.) One of the most interesting aspects of the paper called for (if the Special Commission chose to do so) action by the Special Commission relative to requesting detailed plans from segments within sixty days of the request. Using a realistic timetable of a total of ninety days from the time of the Knapp Report to its possible adoption by the trustees and the Commission, the request to the segments and the full time limit allowed for answering by the segments, this would have seen final action on this single suggested phase by the first of July, 1980, a date we now know would have been too late.

The other most interesting aspect of the Knapp Paper (based upon a planning process between the Boston Campus and the University Administration) is that Boston State and the Massachusetts College of Art would both, by inference, be absorbed by the University of Massachusetts, Boston. The report states that the Special Commission could construct a configuration of public higher education institutions in the Boston area that could include:

1. The University of Massachusetts at Boston as the one four-year and graduate institution of higher education expanded to include...
2. ...the current Massachusetts College of Art as a

distinct unit.

3. ...additional and/or enlarged university level baccalaureate⁶¹ and graduate programs adequate to serve the appropriate student populations in the Greater Boston Area.⁶²

The April, 1980 issue of The Massachusetts Teacher has a comprehensive article on Massachusetts Public Higher Education Reorganization, which makes the following observation-- "If reorganization cannot be effected in a program-matically sound manner, there is the danger that it will be imposed on us through budgetary fiat in the Ways and Means Committee. That would be the worst scenario of all."⁶³

The feelings suggested by the article in The Massachusetts Teacher took tangible shape with the passage of House 6200⁶⁴ through the Massachusetts House of Representatives. The budget bill contained outside language related to major public higher education reorganization, and was due to be released to the public sometime during the day of April 10, 1980. On this date the Special Commission held a full Commission meeting.

The Commission members patiently sat through rather lengthy presentations dealing with educationally oriented topics which were given by Dr. Francis Keppel and Reverend Michael Walsh, S.J.⁶⁵. Again, patience reigned as reports from the Governance and Boston subgroups were presented. (In his report, Senator D'Amico predicted a final Boston

subgroup report four to five weeks after April 17, 1980.)

Then, and only then, did the Special Commission address the issue of the House budget. Several statements were issued with much fervor.

1. Senator D'Amico expressed great fears about the reorganization process.
2. Representative Matrango very perceptively stated that the House had a "potentially evil" budget to work on that was based upon the Ways and Means Committee recommendation.
3. Laura Clausen added that she would not think too highly of any attempt to circumvent the Commission.

The Commission discussed a motion presented by Dr. Hazzard. Dr. Hazzard wished to have all capital outlay expenditures held until the Commission (around September) makes its preliminary report. The original motion was kneaded (and greatly weakened) by a motion gaining the unanimous support of the Commission that cited its opposition to any FY 1981 budget language that would preempt the Commission's mission. Letters would be sent to the Governor, Speaker and Senate President.

One Commission member, who did not wish to be quoted, said later that the Commission should have demanded the appearance before it of Chairman John Finnegan at that point. In fact, stated this member, the Governor, and House and Senate Ways and Means Chairmen, should have been "very

strongly" requested to attend the opening session of the Commission on November 14, 1979.)

During the discussion of the latest House Ways and Means maneuver, Senator John Olver cautioned the group that the Chairmen of the Ways and Means Committees may not listen. The advice was sound, but undoubtedly did not penetrate as effectively as it should have. The Commission at least recognized the devastating implication of H6200, but did nothing to change course in order to adapt to this threat to the need for the Commission's existence. (A concise description of both the contents of House 6200 and the ramifications of its final passage in the House will be found in Appendix H.)

Time Span II

Thus, the first meetings to take place after the House had resolved its particular budget presentation had to have been influenced heavily by that House action.

Taking the Governance subgroup meeting of 4/24/80 first, the subject of the recently passed House Bill 6200 did come up. First, Commission Chairman Walter Boverini opened the meeting by commending Commission member Arnold Friedman for his editorial entitled "How to Reform State Colleges."⁶⁶ Boverini then told the Commission that the message of House 6200 was "to expedite", and the Chairman

said that "nothing is final." He also said "I would never be Chairman of a moot Commission."

Boverini stated that after this meeting, it will be up to the Commission members themselves and the staff to sit down and stop listening and start doing some talking. He felt sure that when the Governor comes he would reinforce those feelings. He told the Commission that although he decried the process of using the budget to implement reorganization, the whole budget process could be completed within five weeks, so that something (perhaps an interim report) has got to be produced by this Commission.

John Olver urged input from the Commission prior to budget approval. George Hazzard questioned if the Commission members could, in fact, agree on general principles. Dr. Singer suggested that an incomplete plan would be better than none.

At this point the discussion seemed to be heading in a direction which could lead to a partial or interim report. Arnold Friedman, however, was staunchly opposed to any plan that might be considered to be poorly conceived, or that would have to circumvent the public hearing process in order to gain implementation. He stated that he would rather have House 6200 than to be forced to submit a poor proposal.

Chairman Boverini suggested using the Boston subgroup recommendation, stonewalling, and standing solidly behind the Boston proposal. He said that the Commission would win.

Before turning the chair over to Dr. Sherry, Boverini said to continue as though nothing happened--the Governor will probably tell you the same thing on May 8th. He also said that "I might get the Speaker and the President to come down and speak also before our group." The advice to continue as though nothing had happened was bad advice if the Commission was to make any real progress. Its present course, if continued unchanged, did not guarantee success. The assertion that the Speaker and President might accompany the Chairman was, unfortunately, made without prior assurances from the parties referred to.

Dr. Sherry, upon assuming the chair, directed the attention of the Governance subgroup members to the first item on the agenda, a review of House 6200. This suggestion met with immediate opposition from several members. Representative Iris Holland railed against the Governor's libbying for the budget. Arnold Friedman, enjoying one of his most forceful meetings said, "I say to Hell with it (House Bill 6200) at this point." He also said the only way that he would consider a Finnegan plan would be if Finnegan submitted his plan to the Commission and not to the Ways and Means Committee.

With fighting words, Robert Spiller echoed Mr. Friedman's feeling, and introduced a few of his own. He ended his remarks with, "We either have a Commission or we do not have a Commission."

Needless to say--Review of H6200 was not considered.

The next section of the meeting was devoted to discussions pertaining to collective bargaining, salaries, and job descriptions. The discussion, and presentation of material, was slow and cumbersome, and an observer could only feel that it might be more prudent for the Commission to move a little faster. Secretary Johnson did bring out one interesting point prior to the end of the discussion in relation to the subject of collective bargaining. He stated that all plans and all preliminary bargaining are moot if an understanding is not available with the executive branch.

After the discussion of collective bargaining procedure, a recess was taken. When the meeting was recalled to order, President John Buckley presented a plan of reorganization developed by the Board of Regional Community Colleges. He also suggested that the Commission do something as quickly as possible. He warned that if the Commission does not respond in some way before the Senate acts upon the budget, this Commission is apt to be irrelevant. (Secretary Johnson also issued a warning during this meeting--The Commission has to interact with the Senate and House.)

A short time later during the meeting, the talk swung to how the Governance subgroup would conduct its next meetings. This discussion used up between ten and fifteen minutes, and was completely unnecessary. It remains a complete mystery to me how Commission members could have

allowed themselves to flounder aimlessly when it was so critical for them to do something positive.

Finally, the meeting began to degenerate at the end. Members became boisterous, and no firm control was exhibited from the chair. Somehow, amid all the growing din, several things were resolved as items for the future:

1. A plan would be developed for Boston.
2. A plan would be developed showing strong centralization, and then a plan would be developed showing effects of decentralization.
3. Union representatives and students would be issued invitations to appear before the Governance subgroup.
4. The staff would work on plans.

Now let us move on to a consideration of the three Boston subgroup meetings of April 17, May 1 and May 6, 1980. In contrast to the prevailing indecisive approval to problem solving exhibited by the Governance subgroup at its April 24, 1980 meeting, the Boston subgroup spent three meetings solidifying its data bank relative to the services and opportunities offered (and needed to be offered) by the six Boston institutions of public higher education. Students, faculty and staff again took part in the discussions with the Boston subgroup, and the subgroup got closer to the point of issuing its preliminary report.

The May 6, 1980 meeting was the eighth meeting of the Boston subgroup. There would be five more.

(The Commission received a message from the Board of Trustees of Southeastern Massachusetts University which was dated May 6, 1980 and which strongly lobbied against one central board which would govern all of public higher education in Massachusetts.)

The Governor arrived at the full Commission meeting of May 8, 1980--alone. Senator Boverini's hope that the Governor would be accompanied by the Speaker and the Senate President was unfounded.

His message was clear. Although he still supported the Commission, he regarded the House action as "a pretty decent stimulus." The Governor did not appear to be at ease in the Commission chambers at any time during the meeting. I had the distinct impression while watching the Governor in action, that he was secretly delighted at the action the House had taken, and was looking forward to a possible reduction in state spending if the Commission failed to come up with a planned alternative to House 6200. It was apparent that the Commission, especially the gubernatorial appointees, expected some heartwarming or buoyant message from Governor King. There was none. The message was very clear. Do something--or else.

Chairman Boverini had stated when the Governor first arrived that the Governor would answer no questions. No one on the Commission tried to challenge that blockade so the only thing the Commission received was a prepared statement.

The Governor did state that he was not even generally aware of the action of the House. However, he agreed with and supported the thrust of the House action.

King urged the Commission to forward what they had, even if it was incomplete. He definitely implied that he wanted some significant action before the end of this legislative year.

The Governor's appearance was brief, and it was an embarrassment to the Commission members on two counts.

1. No questions were allowed.
2. The Governor offered a devastating blow to many members of the Commission by openly endorsing the action of the House of Representatives.

(Even more devastating, at least to this observer, was the attitude of some Commission members who indicated by their words or actions that they not only expected the action of the House but gave it a covert endorsement.)

Before the Governor arrived at the meeting, most of the dialogue of the Commission had been directed at focusing on the issue of some sort of positive action, while some of the dialogue had been reserved for speaking in an angry fashion about the action of the House in passing House 6200. Representative Matrango stated that he apologized to the Commission members for the fact that he and the other members of the legislature were unable to strike the outside reorganization language from the budget, but

does not have to apologize for the manner in which the House/Commission members conducted themselves. "We fought the good fight." He implied that the battle might have been lost, but the war was far from over.

Representative Corazzini wanted the Commission to know that there was no personal vendetta by the Ways and Means Committee, and the House was only interested in causing the Commission to move faster. (Representative Corazzini, although a member of the Commission, had not supported his Commission colleagues in a crucial vote on the House floor during passage of the budget.)

Matrango's reply to Representative Corazzini was correct and cutting. He coldly informed the Representative that what he had just informed the Commission about might very well be completely wrong should the Senate adopt the same outside language as the House.

After the Governor left the May 8, 1980 meeting, a great deal of dialogue took place, Secretary Johnson urged that the Commission trust the Governor, and Arnold Friedman urged that a massive effort to produce a reasonable plan in a short time be considered by the Commission. Laura Clausen stated, "This Commission needs to provide leadership." And, in strong language, Representative Collins openly alluded to delay as a pertinent factor to be dealt with, both as a symbol of the slow pace of the Commission up to the current point, and as something to be avoided in all future work of

the Commission.

Finally, on a motion of Arnold Friedman (supported by a 10 to 5 vote), the Commission decided to meet in marathon session the following weekend.

The Commission members had boldly spurned the idea of discussing the ramifications of House 6200 at their April 24, 1980 Governance meeting. However, discussed or not, that document provided the stimulus for this Commission to stop its procrastinating and agree to channel its energies into a marathon weekend session. Despite the angry railing of the Commission members at the Governor's failure to act quickly on the appointment of members to the Commission and the angry comments directed at the members of the House Ways and Means Committee, the fact remained that all of the Commission's work and data compilation suddenly was coming up short, and something drastic was going to have to be done.

May 8, 1980 marked a sad day for the Commission--the Governor paid a contemptuous and brief visit; one of their own members had deserted their ranks in a House vote; and the Commission had nothing ready to produce for the Senate Ways and Means Committee. The most cruel blow was the continued lack of leadership on the part of those who should have been giving leadership. The future did not look good. However, a chance remained, albeit a long one.

Oddly enough, the Honorable John Collins and Dr.

George Hazzard were both absent from this meeting. Yet, only a week later, their input would shape the future of higher education in Massachusetts.

Just before the May 8, 1980 meeting of the full Commission, a May 5, 1980 Boston Globe article cited the major points of the reorganization plan of State Secretary of Education Charles E. M. Johnson.⁶⁷

The plan was vastly different from, and in many instances directly opposite to, the plan of John Finnegan and the House Ways and Means Committee.

It was an interesting decision making puzzle for the Governor--whether to consider the proposal put forth by his appointee, or whether to continue to (allegedly) support the effort of the legislature.

Time Span III

This section will deal with the Governance subgroup of May 13, 1980 and the Boston subgroup of May 15, 1980.

As agreed to in the April 24, 1980 meeting, arrangements were made to allow spokespersons of bargaining units and students to appear at the May 13, 1980 meeting.

(Scheduled to meet in marathon session on the 16th of May, the Commission was in the position of still being without a definite plan or proposal while it sat through the testimony of various people.)

Representatives of the Massachusetts Teachers Association and the American Federation of Teachers (SMU Division) spoke before the Commission. Also, several students spoke before the Commission, urging among other things student retention on governing and advisory boards, a better articulation policy and flexible programming.

After the presentations, the Commission's Governance subgroup got down to business, and much discussion took place on proposed governance structures. Representative James Collins found himself on the firing line because he suggested that his proposal for a possible governance structure be moved by the Commission for discussion. Mayor John Collins directed some strong doubts on discussing the proposal at Representative Collins, as did Commission member Spiller.

The meeting continued with some semblance of continuity and agreement marking the last portion of the meeting.

1. It was agreed by consensus that there should be twenty-one members on the proposed board, and that the board should approve missions of institutions.
2. It was agreed by the body that no segmental membership should occur on the board (central).
3. There was consensus that a nominating commission should be formed, and the maker, Iris Holland, presented the Commission with a detailed set of guidelines for such a commission.

4. The majority of the Commission gave consensus to Representative Collins's motion.⁶⁸

5. It was agreed that the proposed board have the authority to terminate programs in the public sector.

Finally, it was agreed to individually review the various proposals discussed during this meeting at the beginning of Friday's marathon session.

The Boston subgroup met on Thursday, May 15, 1980, 183 days beyond the first meeting of the Commission. Unknown to the members, the full activity of the majority of the Commission members would cease within thirty days.

It also marked the first official day that House 6200, with its outside language on reorganization, was in the hands of the Senate, in the form of Senate 2200.⁶⁹

The main thrust of the Boston subgroup had been to study the Boston schools as a separate entity. That thrust had been pursued in a diligent manner.

Senator D'Amico read to the subgroup the summary of the recommendations of the Commission staff, and the input of faculty, students and college constituencies, and the Commission itself. The amazing thing is that much of the input from faculty and staff and student bodies dwelled upon the absolute need to retain the individual campuses within the current configuration, and thus was in direct opposition to the recommendations offered in the form of a working paper by the Boston subgroup and its staff.

The recommendations of the Boston subgroup presented by Senator D'Amico included placing all four-year and post-four-year programs currently in Boston under one University structure, putting all community colleges within the Boston area under one structure (and adding a fourth unit to that consortium, the Community College Without Walls), and founding a core city consortium. In addition the package summarized by Senator D'Amico called for the establishment of a task force to draw plans to effect these suggested changes and mergers, and a timetable.

Representative Polaski expressed a need to take a strong look at these recommendations before any votes were taken.

The response by Senator D'Amico was that all members have known about these recommendations, and that he would honor a legitimate request for thorough perusal, if a timetable would be followed.

(This meeting was open for discussion only to the subgroup members.)

Most of the subgroup used the discussion period to protest the thrust of the recommendations rather than to support their thrust. Janet Robinson pleaded for better statistics before she wished to vote on the proposed merger of UMass/Boston, Boston State and the Massachusetts College of Art. Representative King wanted to know if these proposals reflected actual student needs or if they represented,

instead, a pressure group that wants to cut costs.

Senator D'Amico stressed the need for realization that the recommendations before the subgroup have been placed there by unbiased groups, and that even though mergers are mentioned in the recommendation, it is not intended to simply evacuate all current sites.

Senator D'Amico strongly stated the case for all due speed to be followed in a decision by the Commission, but he warned that "There are other elements out there." He stressed that the House and Senate Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee believe in contraction of the institutions at the baccalaureate level.

Secretary Johnson commended Senator D'Amico, and entertained the efforts of all members to try to understand the Senator's commitment. He also made a valuable contribution to the tone of this meeting by seeking an address of the issues one step at a time.

The meeting became a contest between Senator D'Amico and the membership. The contest revolved around the issue of action in this meeting or the issue of no action in this meeting.

Slowly the impasse began to erode.

Finally, the ice was broken. The motion was made by Representative King to vote on the development of a core city consortium. The motion passed, despite some stated opposition.

Other motions followed dealing with proper facilities for Roxbury Community College and others establishing a temporary facility for the Board of Community Colleges, and a location of Massachusetts College of Art in an urban center.

The meeting adjourned some three hours after it started.

Consensus had been reached on some points of the Boston report, but only after practically a physical assault on the subgroup members by the Chairman.

The next day saw the heralded marathon session scheduled. If the Boston subgroup meeting of May 15 was any indicator, the session would prove to be very interesting, indeed.

Representative Collins had made a motion⁷⁰ which was successfully voted by his colleagues. It remained to be seen whether the motion, calling for due process relative to the Commission's report, meant anything of importance to the Commission.

CHAPTER VI

MARATHON SESSION

May, 1980 was a very important month for the Special Commission. The meeting of May 8, 1980 was the date of a visit from the Governor. May 15, 1980 saw the budget come out of the Senate Ways and Means Committee without any outside language on reorganization. May 16 and 17, 1980 saw a marathon session of the Special Commission take place, and the Senate and House budgets were sent to a conference committee in early June after the House in late May refused to concur with the Senate budget presentation.

This chapter will record the details of the marathon session of May 16 and 17, 1980.

Day I - May 16, 1980

Senate and gubernatorial appointees present registered eighty percent attendance, while the House members showed sixty percent attending. Gubernatorial appointee Howell still had not come to a meeting, and this day was no exception. The meeting was the first official one for Judge John Fox, and served as the last official one for Dr. Singer, Senator Buell, and Representative Cimino. (May 8, 1980 had been the last day of attendance for Senator Fonseca.)

The meeting opened with reports from Dr. Sherry and Senator D'Amico. An agenda had been prepared, but some confusion arose early in the meeting relative to what specific course to follow (whether to stay as a full Commission, break into subcommittees, or take some other course). Arnold Friedman suggested that the members stay as a committee of the whole, and take input from all members. In spite of that, shortly afterward, Representative Collins (at 10:55 a.m.) moved that the full Commission participate in a Governance subgroup meeting. It was not formally voted, but took place anyway.

Representative Collins directed Janet Slovin to lead the discussion on the governance issue. Perhaps because of the heightened sense of pressure from outside, the first part of the presentation dealing with the possible forms of governance started off with a high degree of concentration. However, that state of affairs was a momentary thing, and soon the process, in my opinion, began to break down.

For approximately the next hour, a variety of issues was discussed by the Commission members. Commission member Arnold Friedman suggested a direction to take when he suggested that the Commission make a structure first, and then assign powers within the structure. Further direction was suggested by Senator John Olver when he said "We are here because of dissatisfaction with the present system.

Put as much governance as possible at the campus level."

Representative Collins urged his colleagues to consider the establishment of a central board with powers of budget, program and plant, and the power of being the exclusive voice of public higher education before the legislature and the governor. Then Representative Collins suggested that the segmental boards be given powers by this central board so that they can function easily on a local level with central board direction.

That brought about an interesting contest. For the next few minutes, it was Collins vs Collins, as the former Mayor fought the idea of Representative Collins's motion being placed before the group for discussion purposes. Instead, the former Mayor suggested that several options be considered. Finally, Representative Iris Holland cleared the impasse by making a motion that the plan of Representative Collins be used as a model for discussion. The motion was approved, and the meeting progressed.

Representative Collins took the opportunity to immediately launch into a discussion of how the budgets for the institutions will be formulated, and again discussed the function of a central board, and then the role of segmental boards. (Senator John Olver then questioned the need for segmental boards at all.)

Much discussion again took place about the need for segments, with Representative Collins putting the case for

segmental boards as strongly as he could. He cautioned the Commission that a complete lack of segmental boards would force all decisions to be made at the top, with no input from institutions. (It was obvious that most members of the Commission were reluctant to agree, especially quickly, with Representative Collins, but found no effective way to either stifle the Representative or openly fight with him. Instead many Commission members simply used the method of raising small issues that were effective blockers even though none were substantive issues.)

Finally, the topic shifted to another area--budgets and allocations. Extensive debate occurred about the functions of a central board in relation to the budget process, to whom the central board would recommend its budget proposals, and what the merits of the joint legislative Education Committee's input into the process of central board budget proposals would be.

Laura Clausen openly scoffed at any talk of really changing the allocation process, and referred to the many friends in the legislature that the colleges have. Other comments on budgets were advanced by Commissioner Anrig and Secretary Johnson.

After a relatively unprogressive morning, activities stopped while the Commission members broke for lunch.

When the Commission convened again, the first move was to postpone action on any Boston issue until Monday,

May 19, 1980. While within this stance of changing gears, Chairman Boverini then took the opportunity to tell the Commission that if this Commission would do something to produce a piece of legislation, the legislative process could be followed, and he ventured that even those who have already proposed a legislative package of reorganization would be desirous of seeing something positive emanate from the Commission. (His statement that even those who have already proposed a legislative package of reorganization would be pleased to see something come out of the Commission could not have been made with the slightest bit of certainty on his part. I feel that it was a statement to justify the direction that the Commission was taking by holding the marathon session in the first place.)

Senator Olver offered the thought that the House-Senate Conference Committee could be through with its work in early June. This caused Chairman Boverini to state that in the event legislation was agreed upon by the House and Senate Conference Committee, the Commission could still file a plan with the Governor, and the Commission's plan could end up in the outside language of the budget. This suggested mode was a radical departure for Chairman Boverini to take, because up to this point, the only course that he had advised and advocated was one that involved the legislative process. The chairman then urged faster progress (which was also a radical departure for him).

The next action occurred very quietly, but was one of the most significant milestones of the Commission. The Honorable John Collins proposed a 15-member Public/Independent Coordinating Commission which would have broad powers, and the proposal made no arrangements for segmental boards. He wished this board to be examined along with the proposal of Representative Collins. The proposal was made without fanfare or loud noises, but was to provide the substance of an actual reorganization move that became reality.

Secretary Johnson diverted the Commission for a short while by attempting to have the Commission look at the role of the Executive Office of Education. Executive Director Richard Hailer probably offered the most concise statements of his term by stating that the vital link missing in the Secretary's office was power. Without power, it was inferred, all discussion of the Secretary's office was pointless, and should not be pursued.

The meeting continued, this time with a discussion of collective bargaining and its implementation. Basically, one of the main issues was that of deciding where the best place was to deal with personnel, collective bargaining and other important issues. In other words, who is the employer?

Representative Collins pushed diligently for the inclusion of the segmental boards within the governance structure. Dr. Sherry stated that he felt a consensus approved the strong central board concept, but he felt from what was said

that segmental boards were necessary. Both Dr. Sherry and Representative Collins tried to set the stage to elicit a consensus vote from the Commission members.

Representative Mullins moved to continue discussion of the concept of a Board of Governors, but was driven to intense anger when the subject of institutional autonomy arose. Representative Mullins jumped in angrily to say that the whole question of institutional autonomy was thrown into a cocked hat three or four years ago when the legislature appropriated money for institutions to hire faculty members and the money was used for administrators instead. That, he said was the crux of the situation today that found the legislature unwilling to let the colleges and universities have true fiscal autonomy. Although it was not noted in the official minutes, the motion to continue discussion of the Board of Governors passed.

Almost immediately afterward, Representative Holland offered a motion to have the Board of Governors set tuition policy and that the fees should be established by segments (or individual institutions). However, the motion was withdrawn momentarily by consensus.

Chancellor Clausen initiated, with the help of Representative Collins, a discussion of programmatic issues. While the Commission members started to coordinate their thoughts on this issue Representative Holland called for a vote on her previous motion regarding tuition policy.

The motion was declared approved by Chairman Boverini, and the discussion on programmatic issues resumed.

Dr. Sherry, who was having one of his most visible (and audible) meetings this day again tried to establish consensus among the members regarding programmatic issues within public institutions as might be ordained by the Board of Governors.

Representative Collins again came to the rescue by proposing a motion as follows: "The Board of Governors shall assume present Board of Higher Education authority to review and approve programs and degrees for public and private institutions. Further, the Board of Governors shall have the authority to rescind programs and degrees for public institutions by a two-thirds vote. Further, the Board of Governor's programmatic guidelines for public institutions, including approval/disapproval of missions and preparation of a master plan, shall be those outlined in Chancellor Clausen's working paper presented to the Commission; with the exception that segmental missions shall replace institutional missions if segmental structure is retained. Definition of program shall be as presently defined by the Board of Higher Education."⁷¹ The motion was approved.

After the motion was passed, Dr. Sherry proposed that because of the shortened time line the Governance subgroup would work through the night and the first part of

the day tomorrow, and then present a consensus to the full Commission on the afternoon of May 17. Commissioner Anrig and Senator D'Amico both supported Dr. Sherry's proposal. The thought was formed into a motion, and approval was voted. The full Commission stood adjourned.

After the Governance subgroup reconvened, many topics were brought on the table, including affirmative action, personnel policies, planning, and scholarships".

The following actions are worthy of record.

Representative Collins, indefatigably, pursued the idea of segmental authority to be formed as well as a central Board of Governors. He asked for the consensus of the Commission's Governance subgroup relative to whether or not to favor the general concept of supporting the idea of segmental authority.

Chancellor Clausen raised the question of possibly doing away with the idea of segments entirely. But, Commissioner Anrig suggested that segments were absolutely necessary because of the fact that there are thirty institutions, and one board could not do the job. Senator Olver wondered about the number of segments that would be needed, and on a practical basis said that the number is not as important as the concept of endorsing segmental boards. Arnold Friedman opted for segmental level governance, also. He agreed with the form of segmental governance suggested by Representative Collins (universities and state colleges together, community

colleges separate).

Representative Collins took advantage of the cresting feeling for segmental governance which appeared to be occurring by reaffirming the logic of the inclusion of segmental governance. Dr. Sherry came very close to getting a consensus regarding segments immediately after the remarks of Secretary Johnson, but Dr. Hailer wanted to say a few words first. This came very close to being a nearly fatal mistake, and was certainly poor procedure.

Dr. Hailer's remarks included glowing praise of Representative James Collins for all the hard work that he had done.

Approximately nine minutes after Dr. Sherry first called for a consensus on segments, he called for one again. He again missed the opportunity, this time giving the floor to Senator Olver.

Several minutes later, Arnold Friedman said, "Move the question." Representative Collins then got up and clarified his motion once again.

Finally, the question was moved (after another sixty seconds of clarification) and it was approved unanimously.

The next question dealt with advisory boards, and the qualifications of members of same. Dr. Sherry put forward his recommendations relative to advisory boards, and the specific recommendations were then discussed. Senator Olver offered advice to have more than one alumni representative

on the advisory board, and Secretary Johnson concurred. The Commission unanimously approved the concept of advisory boards for those institutions which did not have a board of trustees on campus. Specific determination of advisory board makeup would be determined at a later date.

After a very short break, a very touchy subject was discussed by the Governance subgroup. This subject was the function of the Office of the Executive Secretary of Education. Many oblique references had been made to the Office of Secretary of Education throughout the past several months. Now, the mechanism of the Governance subgroup would allow a close inspection of that system. Secretary Johnson used the opportunity to point out the various functions of the Secretary's office. The Secretary also pointed out that the function of the Secretary has changed since inception, and these changes have resulted in a stronger and more modern structure of services.

Commissioner Anrig speculated that there will always be an Executive Office of Educational Affairs whether this Commission deems it so or not. This statement led Dr. Sherry to shift the direction of the Governance subgroup from a consideration of the function of the Secretary in general to, instead, a consideration of the role of the Secretary with the proposed Board of Governors. Further, the next question was that of whether the Governor (or specific designee) should sit on the proposed Board of

Governors.

If the Secretary had any fears of what the Governance subgroup felt about the future of the office of the Secretary, they were allayed by the discussion and expressions of consensus relative to his position on the evening of May 16, 1980 (even though other quarters were not as charitable).

Representative Collins suggested that the proposed Board of Governors be the sole authority on budget and programs dealing with the legislature and governor, and to that end proposed a recommendation to separate the Secretary of Education from any line authority of budgetary or programmatic dealings. At the same time, Representative Collins made a niche for the Secretary in relation to any future nominating committee that might be formulated to screen potential members of advisory boards and boards of trustees. The motion was seconded (by the Secretary of Education) and then passed. Consensus was then reached (unanimously) that the Governor or the Secretary of Education would sit on the Board of Governors.

Several other points were discussed throughout the remainder of the evening, commencing with a discussion of enrollment. However, no action was taken on the subject because of the lack of a specific direction on how enrollment should be treated. Instead, the concept of enrollment was allowed to be included in the subject of long-range

planning. Two additional items, one dealing with budget and the other with collective bargaining, were put forth by Representative Collins but the only concrete action taken was an agreement by the few remaining Commission members (regular and ex officio) to discuss them on the morning of May 17th. Adjournment was voted.

The first of two days of marathon session had ended. Former Mayor John Collins only attended one of the two sessions, and Dr. George Hazzard would attend neither. However, the Collins-Hazzard proposal, that would emanate from this Commission as a minority report, possessed the potential for massive impact on public higher education.

Day II - May 17, 1980

The meeting of the Governance subgroup resumed. Representative Collins summarized the work of the Governance subgroup to date, and repeated all recommendations relative to that work. He stated that the proposed Board of Governors (referred to by the author at various times in this dissertation as BOG, also) would essentially have the power of the present Board of Higher Education. The proposed structure follows.

1. Twenty-one member board (at large)
2. Five-year terms
3. Appointments made through a nominating commission.

4. BOG would have internal fiscal autonomy.
5. BOG would have final authority on budget prior to presentation to legislature and governor.
6. BOG would have programmatic powers.
7. BOG would have planning responsibility.
8. BOG would have authority to develop an information system.
9. BOG would set tuition.
10. BOG will give final approval to capital outlay recommendations.
11. BOG would arrange for coordination of financial aid guidelines.
12. BOG would have the authority to form and implement policy regarding affirmative action.
13. BOG would oversee segmental boards.
14. Segmental Boards would have specific powers.

(The full text of the Governance subgroup working paper will be found in Appendix F.)

The various portions of the Governance subgroup working paper were discussed, refined and voted upon. Details were interjected for discussion, sometimes approved and sometimes disapproved or withdrawn.

The subject of budget was discussed, with the central theme dealing with the Board of Governors receiving sufficient power so that in case an individual segment or institution attempted to circumvent the Board of Governors by

going directly to the legislature (or specific members of the legislature) for increased appropriations, disciplinary force could be exerted by the BOG on that institution or segment. (It was a point well taken, because business in Massachusetts between public higher education and the legislature has been by history overt and covert, with a great deal of the latter taking place.)

A very worthy idea was advanced by Robert Spiller, Commission member, who advocated the use of tuition funds by the institutions which received them, instead of sending them back to the state. Fellow commissioners Holland and Anrig concurred with Mr. Spiller, but the matter was never refined in this meeting in a manner which allowed resolution. Unfortunately, it was referred to the proposed Board of Governors for their study.

Arnold Friedman also made a valuable attempt to clarify a loosely coordinated part of current higher education when he attempted to have the Commission resolve the issue of building authorities. He wanted to know why joint efforts couldn't be combined into a single authority. It was suggested that any such coordination wait for the results of the Special Ward Commission now investigating construction practices in the Commonwealth.

The mission of colleges and universities was discussed, with consensus reached by the Commission that the Board of Governors would determine the mission of the seg-

ments and the institutions within the segments, and the segments would determine the admissions policies for the institutions under its control.

Finally, after two days of discussion, Representative James Collins moved that the Governance report be forwarded to the full Commission.

The motion passed.

Senator Walter Boverini assumed the chair, and presided over the quickest action of the day.

Dr. Sherry proposed that the Commission accept and adopt the report of the Governance subgroup, and a poll of the membership was the basis of a motion by Representative Menard.

Both passed, and the meeting was adjourned. The long weekend was over.

The Sunday Republican of May 18, 1980 reported the outcome of the meeting in detail, and the headline said "College Plan Drafted." The newspaper account made it seem as though this plan would probably become the final one.⁷²

The end result looked impressive, but was far from complete. I fully agreed with the need for a strong central board, and felt that the action recommending a twenty-one member Board of Governors (with no segmental representation after a transition period) was excellent. But, no definite plan dealing directly with the issue of segmental governance was addressed.

A review of the action taken by the Commission reveals the following points.

1. The proposed legislative package was broad, but failed to adequately address the issues of segmental board governance and tuition payment recognition to participating public colleges and universities.
2. The package made reference to routes of communication between the Board of Governors and segments, and between segments and individual institutions, without really establishing a structure to make sure that communication took place.
3. Provisions were made to allow for a five-year master plan, with no provision made that ensured its formulation.
4. A great deal of the package put together by the Governance subgroup was formed with the direct help of Commissioner Anrig, Chancellor Clausen and Secretary Johnson (ex officio members of the Commission).

Certainly, the input of the three professionals was interesting and informative. However, the potential elimination of two of the above positions brings me to the opinion that the ex officio members should have been used as consultants rather than direct participants.

5. The entire package was put together in a partial vacuum because the legislative members of the Great and General Court, with the exception of the Commission members, had given it no promise of support.

The House and Senate leadership was never overtly contacted in reference to its potential approval of the proposed legislative package.

6. No attempt was made to seek the support of the educational community in a giant effort to get the measure approved.

7. Finally, the package was put together so hurriedly, and without all Commission members present at the final marathon meeting, that the Commission members themselves did not have ample time to understand it or to fully extend their support for it.

The final Governance meeting of the Commission's term had closed, and had produced an avalanche of suggested structure whose value would be determined within a couple of weeks.

In the next chapter, I shall address the output of the Boston subgroup as well as the final full meeting of the Special Commission.

CHAPTER VII

THE FINAL STROKE

The Special Commission on reorganization only had a few short days of existence left as of May 19, 1980. Its effective life would end on June 11, some twenty-four days later. A very slow start had handicapped the Commission because outside forces had moved quickly to establish a massive strike force, and these forces had maneuvered the Commission into a retaliatory pattern of action to produce legislation which was hastily conceived, hurriedly activated, and imploringly dispatched to the legislature. Commission Chairman Walter Boverini had also filed the minority report sponsored by Dr. George Hazzard and the Honorable John Collins.

The thrust of the minority report called for a fifteen-member central board, allowed for no segmental boards, established boards of trustees at each individual institution and provided those boards with strong powers, abolished both the Office of Secretary of Education and the Board of Higher Education and gave the central board strong and specific powers.

Finishing Touches

Thus, on May 19, 1980, the fourth-from-the-last Boston subgroup meeting was held in an aura of tension.

The atmosphere was a charged one in a general sense. The final Commonwealth budget for FY '82, along with any outside language, was going to be reviewed and decided upon by a Conference Committee of House and Senate members; the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee still held to most of his original thoughts on reorganization of higher education; the Governor had for all practical purposes denied his support to the Commission; and a proposal for governance had been produced by the Commission, but no one on the Commission could be certain that the proposal would turn out to be anything but a paper exercise.

The May 19, 1980 Boston subgroup meeting would be the first of a series of meetings of that body to be held in May and June. Because of outside pressures, the Boston subgroup found itself racing to finish its deliberations.

The reader will recall that in Chapter IV of this work I highlighted the prediction of Foster Furcolo that the Commission may never get around to making final recommendations. Also, the reader will remember several instances where the Commission was urged to hurry along. Now it was critical for the Boston subgroup to move quickly and effectively, and it was doubtful if that objective could be

reached.

The Chairman, Senator D'Amico, opened the May 19, 1980 Boston subgroup meeting with a review of the previous meeting's action. His next action was to ask the Boston subgroup to consider approval of a motion which would offer protection to any administrator, faculty and professional and nonprofessional staff at Boston State College who might be transferred as a result of incorporation to a different operating authority because of action recommended by the Commission or any subgroup of the Commission.

The motion was not given quick approval, by any means. One complicating factor was the interruption of proceedings by a House roll call, so that the pending vote required the return of the temporarily absent House members. Another factor was the very real opposition and/or stubborn resistance on the part of the Commission members to any quick acceptance of Senator D'Amico's motion as it was presented. To be specific, Representatives Pokaski and King and Chancellor Hammond were less than happy with Senator D'Amico's proposal. Their basic unhappiness seemed to stem from a perception that UMass/Boston had not fulfilled its potential for people in comparison to Boston State College, and therefore Boston State should not be placed under UMass/Boston.

In the face of explicit criticism of his motion Senator D'Amico momentarily dropped his pleasant manner,

and stated that all data being discussed had been around for quite a while, and he implied that criticism was uncalled for now. He stated, with the help of Dr. Hailer, that all reasoning was based on demographics and not upon emotions, and categorized his ideas as being ideas on middle ground. (Interestingly, he rather testily told the members of the subgroup that if he had wanted to rush this issue of incorporation through, he would have held a marathon session over the past weekend, but he did not do so because he thought that that "would have been wrong...very wrong." In light of the May 16 and 17 marathon just completed, with its resulting legislative proposals, Senator D'Amico's remarks were extremely interesting.)

Representative Pokaski proved to be vociferous on the subject of the proposed incorporation. His main argument was that the incorporation would/could lead to a disjunction of the learning process on the part of students affected by the proposed incorporation. He stated that his only purpose in offering resistance was to try to ensure protection for the proposed clients. (This was really the first visible and audible major input of Representative Pokaski all year.)

A second roll call in the House Chambers caused another delay in the Boston subgroup proceedings. Senator D'Amico used the intermission to state that there was no way that all students now at Boston State could fit at UMass/Boston, even though Chairman Finnegan and Chairman Atkins appeared

to think that it can be done. He also stated that he felt the Boston subgroup was not ready to address the issue of actual incorporation or merger.

A great deal of the discussion centered around the proposed name of the potential college/university. In a move to compromise, Senator D'Amico suggested that the name Boston State be removed from his motion and instead the mantle of intended protection should be extended to all four-year Boston public institutions and their administrators, faculty and professional/nonprofessional employees. He strongly emphasized that his revised motion only protected all employees in the event of incorporation, and in no way even suggested a possible governance structure within Boston.

After more discussion, some objective and some subjective, and almost ninety minutes after the motion was first presented to the assemblage, the Honorable John Fox and Representative Murray prompted, through adroit statements, the immediate consideration of the question.

(Another of the causes of the slow progress on Senator D'Amico's motion was the inability of anyone present to quickly put together acceptable amendment language, and the inability of anyone to respond with alacrity to the need for the language of compromise. Certainly, people on the staff of the Special Commission had the experience and expertise to work exceptionally well with language. Obviously, their

talents were not called upon.)

The motion, now officially made by Representative Murray (as Senator D'Amico withdrew his motion making reference to a specific motion), was approved. It was most interesting to watch Senator D'Amico at work. He literally bulled his ideas through the subgroup, and spoke from the chair to every motion as well.

The action of the meeting continued, with much discussion taking place relative to meeting the needs of students, and the need to provide open access. To that end, it was voted that should incorporation of Boston State and UMass/Boston take place, these campuses shall constitute the incorporated institution. After much debate on principles governing a consolidated institution between Chancellor Hammond and Senator D'Amico, two motions were passed which allowed for the incorporated institution to be an educationally and administratively integrated system, and committed the incorporated institution to open access and quality education. The motions did much to dispel the fears of some Commission members who hoped that any incorporation would not lose the unique aspects of the Boston State College campus.

As the meeting adjourned, plans were affirmed to meet the next day.

The Boston subgroup on May 20, 1980 again reviewed plans for a possible incorporation of at least two insti-

tutions in the Boston Area. Senator D'Amico's efforts were focused on location of this institution as well. In spite of interruptive roll calls, arguments among Commission members and, surprisingly, a vote against incorporation, Senator D'Amico managed to fight his way to a decision by the Commission in favor of incorporation of UMass/Boston and Boston State (but to leave Massachusetts College of Art by itself). The only part of the plan that, upon my review of it almost one year beyond the date of that Boston subgroup meeting, proved to be neither foresighted nor quick enough was the provision that legislation affecting and effecting the proposed incorporation did not have to be written until September 30, 1980. Sufficient time did not exist, however.

The Boston subgroup met again on Tuesday, May 27, 1980. It was day 195 of the Commission's term.

The first action was the proposal of a motion by Representative Pokaski which offered a suggestion that if evidence arose to indicate that the incorporation of merger of Boston State College and UMass/Boston was educationally unsound or administratively not feasible, such incorporation or merger should not take place. The motion was approved. It was not surprising that Representative Pokaski offered this motion because it was evident at the May 19, 1980 Boston subgroup meeting that he was showing a great deal of reservation regarding the incorporation of UMass/Boston

and Boston State College. (It should be noted that he is a graduate of Boston State College.)

Next, Nancy Wylie from the Board of Regional Community Colleges presented a mass of statistics (both in verbal form and written form). Ms. Wylie's report was used by the Commission as an indicator of expanded community college need in the Boston area, and as an indicator of a need for a community college without walls. She also mentioned cooperative education (as had President McKenzie of Massachusetts Bay Community College), but did not stress this as her main point. By comparison, with other areas, Ms. Wylie pointed out the inadequacy of the present Boston community response to dealing with nontraditional student needs.

After both the completion of Ms. Wylie's formal presentation and an interrupting House roll call, Senator D'Amico expounded upon the subject of expanding the community college system within the greater Boston area. Senator D'Amico mentioned his interest in expanding the services, for instance, to the City of Quincy, by converting its municipally subsidized Junior College to membership in the community college system. From time to time, Ms. Wylie responded to questions from the Boston subgroup, but it was evident that her data was compiled without an emphasis on precision. Ms. Wylie's own evaluation of her data corroborated this.

The last part of the meeting dealt with a discussion of missions of Boston community colleges, the concept of the College Without Walls, and a discussion of the need to invite the Interim President and members of the Massachusetts Board of Community Colleges to the next meeting of the Boston subgroup. A motion was made to do so, and it was approved.

Day 202 of the Commission's term witnessed the last meeting of the Boston subgroup. Representatives of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges were present, including the interim president and four board members.

Chairman D'Amico greeted the five representatives of the MBRCC, and then immediately put forth three motions which were to provide the basis of discussion during the meeting. The motions dealt with three specific areas:

1. A proposed expansion of the community college system in Boston.
2. The expansion shall provide general and career programs.
3. The expansion shall be concurrent with an improved and coordinated delivery of quality educational services.

The motions were put onto the table for discussion.

Chairman Buckley, first to speak, quickly pointed out that the MBRCC has attempted to provide full services to

Boston students, but a lack of funding prevented all from being done which needed to be done. President Buckley stated that the MBRCC certainly agrees with the Commission's aim to build a new facility for Roxbury Community College in the southwest corridor. Again, he referred to the lack of funding that has been prevalent for the last few years.

Dr. Muriel Camarra, a member of the Board of Trustees and Vice-Chairman of the board, spoke on the importance of providing career and educational services under the aegis of the full community college, and not under the aegis of an outreach center. This might be a way to cut down the presence of anything but the image of quality education. She stressed that the community college must help to bolster the image of those who badly need educational services as well as provide the services. She also spoke in support of one Boston community college with several campuses, and proposed only one president for the entire string of Boston campuses.

Dr. Camarra ended her testimony by suggesting that the Special Commission should provide extensive leadership to the educational community within the Commonwealth.

The presence of the trustees at the meeting undoubtedly caused the numerous references to historical perspectives regarding the community college system. Trustee Robert Simha recounted failure of three gubernatorial administrations to support an in depth look at the governance

structure of the community college; he appreciated the attempt of this commission to elicit information regarding governance.

(The day before this meeting, a Conference Committee formed for the purpose of ruling on the budget was appointed from the Senate and the House. Outside forces were closing in, but the tone of this meeting of June 3rd was one of historical review, and discussion of future governance alignments. The subject of the discussions betrayed none of the urgency that should have been foremost upon the knowledge of formulation of the House and Senate Conference Committee. This particular reaction to the impending crunch of potential legislative dictation of reorganization, as evinced by the testimony of the trustees present, makes one wonder at how past issues were regarded.)

Trustee Simha made many references to the high quality of education obtainable through the community colleges, but, as many others had stated before him, he claimed that the previous small resources disbursed to the community colleges had not allowed the community college system to reach its potential.

Senator D'Amico cautioned the participating trustees that all of this conversation could be moot if the legislature took things into its own hands.

The last part of the meeting was dedicated to a discussion of Senator D'Amico's original motions. All three

motions, after minor amendments, were moved and voted. The meeting then adjourned abruptly, and all further action was put off until the Commission meeting of June 11, 1980.

Essentially, the Boston subgroup had approved in principle the greater coordination of four-year institutions within the city of Boston, had approved the establishment of a multiple campus community college system within Boston run by a single president, maintained the unique status of the Massachusetts College of Art, approved a new facility for Roxbury, and had addressed several other important issues.

None of the subgroup work had been formally presented to either the full Commission or the legislature.

A massive amount of data had been collected. It remained to be seen if anything positive would result.

The Boston subgroup had reached the identical point in its progress that had been reached by the Governance subgroup. It had conducted its last meeting.

Import of Disaster

Only eight days remained until the full Commission meeting of June 11, 1980. But before the Commission could meet, disaster struck.

The full import of the impending disaster first surfaced to the general public in a June 6, 1980 article in

the Boston Globe.⁷³ The article referred to Chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee Chester Atkins and his remarks concerning the budget as a conduit for outside legislation relating to reorganization. Although previously opposed to including the House reorganization plan in outside budget language, Atkins allegedly leaned toward a reorganization plan based on a proposal of Special Commission members George Hazzard and John Collins.

On the same day, an article in the Springfield, Massachusetts Morning Union that reported Chester Atkins had, in fact, embraced the Collins-Hazzard model of reorganization drew the ire of Representative James Collins, also a Special Commission member. Vowing to vote against the plan, and stating that it would "spell the end of quality public higher education in this state," Collins will file remedial legislation if the plan becomes part of the fiscal year 1981 budget process.⁷⁴

The June 10th, 1980 edition of the Boston Globe reported that the House and Senate Conference Committee of the Massachusetts legislature had agreed to forward the reorganization package to both Houses.⁷⁵

The newspapers published in Massachusetts on June 11, 1980 told the story. Both branches of the legislature had passed the budget, including the outside language forming a strong central Board of Regents, and the budget was now forwarded to the Governor. The Boston Globe editorial of

that day stated in its headline that the higher education bill reeked of backroom tactics.⁷⁶

The official roll calls of the House and Senate showed three members of the Special Commission on Reorganization voting for the reorganization package, and two members not voting. Representatives Corazzini and Pokaski, and Senator Olver, voted for the budget, and Senator Boverini and Representative Matrango (the latter very ill) did not participate in the vote. The House vote for the budget and reorganization was 102 yes, 52 no.

The Senate vote for the same was 19 yes, 15 no. In addition to Senator Boverini, Senate President Bulger and Senators Amick, Bertonazzi, Lewis and Wetmore were not recorded as voting.

A Devastating Experience

About one hundred people were in the audience for the Wednesday, June 11, 1980 meeting of the Special Commission. The agenda called for subcommittee reports. They were never given. Instead, in an atmosphere of dejection, the possible fate of the Commission was discussed.

Chairman Boverini rationalized his action of filing the majority and minority reports into the legislature by stating that he had never deviated from his intent to ensure that everything coming out of the Commission should go

through the whole process of public hearings. However, he stunned the Commission members and spectators present when he said, "Lest I deceive you, I am not strongly opposed to any plan that was accepted by the legislature."

It was akin to betrayal. The members sat silent for several long quiet seconds. The ultimate crash had happened. First, the Conference Committee and the legislature had taken the reorganization process right out of the Commission's hands. Then, three members of the Commission had voted for the legislative reorganization proposal, and one of the two Commission members who did not participate in the final vote had attended the opera instead. Now, the Commission members were being told that their Chairman was really not too unhappy about the outcome.

Senator D'Amico stated that he didn't want to take one further step until the status of the Commission was clarified. It was evident that the general feeling was that until the status of the Commission was finalized, it was foolish to continue with any future plans.

A motion was made to have the Commission members meet with the Governor, the Speaker of the House, and the Senate President.

The members finally agreed upon the following Commission representatives to meet with the three officials cited above: Chairman Walter Boverini, Representative James Collins, Honorable John Fox, Arnold Friedman, Janet Robinson,

Dr. Francis Sherry, and Robert Spiller.

The major portion of the meeting was given to angry statements as well as statements that reflected a great deal of hurt.

Representative King said that the present administration has a horrible record on the issue of race. He also felt that this Commission would be doing a disservice to many people if it disbanded. His words to the Commission were, "Don't walk away."

Senator Iris Holland bemoaned the fact that "Nobody is listening. Why should we work if nobody will listen?"

Representative Mullins urged the Commission not to go in to see the Governor and legislative leadership unless it's made clear that this Commission has been betrayed.

About an hour after it had begun, the meeting stopped, and the Commission effectively did the same.

C H A P T E R V I I I
SUMMARY: FACT AND SPECULATION

It is very easy to pass judgment, but indescribably hard to justify the specific judgements made.

I shall attempt here not to make judgments, but to point out a great number of conditions which affected the outcome of the Special Commission on Reorganization. Some of these conditions existed at the time of the Commission's formation, and some developed during the same time frame as the Commission's.

The Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education was formed under several clouds which boded ill for its future. The previous Special Commission (referred to in earlier chapters), had done extremely little during its brief tenure. Thus, the present Commission had no great model of success to refer to, but merely an exercise on paper to research. The present Commission contained a member who represented (and in fact, literally, headed) the State College System, and also included, in ex officio status, the Executive Secretary of Educational Affairs, the Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education, and the Commissioner of Education. All four persons certainly had specific constituencies and/or agencies to look out for, and one would

have to assume that all of their work on the Special Commission had at least the inference of self-serving awareness of their constituencies, even if an actual self-serving course of action did not exist.

Members of the legislature could be considered to have had special interests as well.

Some other members of the Commission, while not representing any particular constituency, certainly did not give their complete dedication to the Commission's work. Their attendance record in some cases was quite poor; in one case, one Commission member did not attend even one meeting.

Throughout the proceedings of the Special Commission, a casual observer would have found it almost impossible to detect a true "focus" of the Commission that had any staying power. The direction of the Commission never assumed any solid bent, but seemed to change as the months went by. Part of the problem could be traced to the thrust of Chairman Boverini, who exhibited quite a carefree attitude at first, then became more intent on coming up with something to show for the Commission's efforts, and finally showed by his example that politics within the legislature was the most important factor in his Senate/Commission activities. Also, part of the problem occurred because of the failure of the Commission members to agree on a specific course of

action. The Commission had two separate subgroups operating at the same time, and although this situation allowed for diversity, the situation also prohibited a unified direction with a concurrent singular course of action.

After all the work of the Special Commission, one chilling fact demanded to be recognized--the legislature remained boss. This fact proved to be irrefutable in spite of the Commission's marathon session of May 16 and 17, 1980. The attempt at a whirlwind finish for the Commission was superseded by the action of the legislature in fashioning its own reorganization package.

Despite the fact that fifteen of the Commission's members were also members of the legislature, the imposing force of the remaining 150 House members and 35 Senate members enabled the legislature to do what it wanted to do when it wanted to do it. The thrust of the legislature in recent years had been to issue criticisms of the Massachusetts public higher education system in relation to its efficiency and to its effectiveness. Furthermore, the support of the public higher education system in Massachusetts by the legislature was far less than it should have been. With that background, it was relatively easy for Representative John Finnegan, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to engineer a passage of a reorganization package through the House within the medium of the House budget. It was later just as easy for the House-

Senate Conference Committee to agree on a massive change for public higher education without granting public hearings, or without really consulting the members of the public higher education constituency.

Other reasons proved to be important ones in a study of why the Commission failed to reach its goals. The members of the various segments openly rejected directions suggesting consolidation, and most segmental discussions of reorganization centered on retention of current parochialism. The competition among the public institutions of higher education that had become a way of life over the last several years did not cease during the life of the Special Commission. It seemed to intensify. Each one of the segments offered at least one plan for reorganization, and each plan was unique. A general feeling of doom pervaded the meetings of the Special Commission, and overshadowed the brief moments of elation that seemed to spring up on occasion when it seemed the Commission had taken a giant step forward.

One of the most devastating moments in the life of the Commission took place on May 8, 1980 when Governor Edward J. King visited the group. His lack of positive support for the Commission was a very unpleasant thing for me to witness, and must have been even more grueling to sit through for the members of the Commission. Some positive support by the Governor would have served notice on the

legislature that the Commission would be the vehicle by which reorganization would come to pass. The lack of such support left the door wide open for the legislature to work its will.

Hypothesis

One hypothesis that I feel deserves advancement is that the very presence and activity of the Special Commission allowed the legislature to create its own reorganization package. The formation of the House reorganization package, coming at a time when the Special Commission was failing to make positive progress, allowed a concrete plan of the legislature to take center stage.

Has the Commission not existed, any legislative attempt to produce a reorganization package probably would have been opposed.

The existence of the Commission allowed the plans sponsored by the legislature to achieve credibility and a superior stature. Instead of producing a plan of its own in plenty of time to be pushed through the legislature, the Commission procrastinated long enough to give the legislature the opening that it needed.

Observations

After studying the Commission's eight months of work,

the following observations appear to be valid reasons for the failure of the Commission to succeed.

1. The Commission did not have strong popular support. It is probable that the majority of the citizens of the Commonwealth had no great interest in the workings of the Commission, and thus offered no great swell of support for the Commission's efforts. Because of the lack of clarity relative to the goals of the Commission, it would have been difficult for the majority of citizens of the Commonwealth to understand the full import of the thrust of the Commission anyway.

2. The Commission did not have strong legislative or gubernatorial support. It was evident from the Governor's visit to the Commission on May 8, 1980 that the Governor would rather lose the faith of the Commission than a good working relationship with the legislature. It was also apparent that the legislature in general did not evince much support for the work of the Commission. Beginning with the passage of the House budget bill containing a suggested reorganization package, and continuing down to the votes of the House and Senate on the suggestions of the Budget Conference Committee, the legislature showed that it was boss. (In his annual address to the legislature given on January 12, 1981, Governor Edward J. King highlighted the accomplishment of the reorganization of public higher education as one of the major benchmarks of his administration.

Robert L. Turner, writing in the Boston Globe, said that the speech "included items for which King should take a subordinate level of credit. These include the higher education reorganization, which would have been impossible without House Ways and Means Chairman John J. Finnegan..."⁷⁷

3. The Commission did not have strong support from public higher education. The goals of the segments of public higher education were not coincidental with those of the Commission. Although some surface opposition from the segments was apparent in relation to suggestions from the Commission for future changes, the majority of opposition was covert, and was generated in an attempt to keep a relatively comfortable situation current. Most site visits of the Boston subgroup were greeted with reasons why the current systems of segmental organization, and their components as well, should not be changed. Perhaps the leadership in public higher education only reflected and/or reinforced the kind of vacuum found in the Commission itself.

4. The Commission did not have the quantity of strength needed to overcome the massive liabilities cited in items one, two and three. Arnold Friedman had used the power of the press to promulgate his feelings on who should carry out the reorganization of higher education in Massachusetts, but I'm afraid that the excellently written editorial failed to stir the populace enough so that the citizens would take umbrage with the methods employed by the legislature. The

Commission did not have the stature needed to take on the Governor, the legislature, the segments of public higher education in relation to a cause that failed to engender popular support as well. The odds of the Commission's success at meeting its aspirations became more and more poor as the life of the Commission was extended.

5. The leadership of the Commission was not dynamic. The tempo of leadership shifted several times during the life of the Commission. Although the leadership of the two subgroups showed sporadic life, the efforts of the two leaders (Senator D'Amico and Dr. Sherry) were not enough to counteract the lack of dynamism overall. Part of the reason for difficulty in maintaining positive progress of the Commission through its leadership stemmed from the dynamics of the individual members of the Commission. Even more important than the dynamics exhibited individually was the timing of same. For instance, Representative Pokaski did not say or do too much for most of the life of the Commission, but became a potent force to deal with, and raised formidable obstacles to swift completion of Boston subgroup action, during the last days of the Commission. Representative William Mullins launched many fiery invectives during the course of the Commission's deliberations at the ineptitude of the trustees who ran the various institutions. Each meeting found at least one or two of the members dominating the proceedings

with their own particular mode of action.

Another reason for the lack of forthright leadership was the fact that quite a few meetings were spent in sifting through material that should have been distributed to the Commission in more succinct form. When material has to be literally waded through while a Commission is meeting in regular session, one can see that forward progress will be jeopardized.

6. Finally, the culmination of the Commission's work came too late, was too hastily conceived, had no direct support of the legislature and was not put together in a cohesive and attractive package. Because there was very little reason for the legislature to even consider adoption of the Commission's offering, the inevitable happened--the Commission's attempt at creating a package of reorganization failed. The legislature prevailed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

¹Broadcast on public commercial radio, WHYN, Springfield, Massachusetts, circa 1976.

²Chapter 393 of the year 1979, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Massachusetts Legislature, signed by Speaker of the House and President of Senate on July 11, 1979 and signed with specific disapprovals by the Governor on July 19, 1979. (Article by Michelson found in Appendix A).

³Dr. Robert L. Randolph, former President of Westfield State College was granted a leave because of health reasons on May 18, 1978, and then employed by the Central Board Office commencing in June, 1978. Please refer to the Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), April 8, 1979, sec. B, p. 1.

⁴Massachusetts State Senator Walter Boverini, Lynn, Senate Majority Whip, Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), April 8, 1979, sec. B, p. 1.

⁵Massachusetts State Representative William D. Mullins, Ludlow, member of House Education Committee, Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), April 8, 1979, sec. B, p. 1.

⁶Massachusetts State Representative James G. Collins, Amherst, Member of House Education Committee, remarks supposedly made in early summer of 1979, and printed in the Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), December 23, 1979, sec. B, p. 1.

⁷Marilyn McCoy and D. Kent Halstead, Higher Education Financing in the Fifty States, Interstate Comparisons Fiscal Year 1976 (Review Edition), Sponsored jointly by National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and National Institute of Education, U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington, D.C.: September 1979.)

⁸Springfield Daily News, (Springfield, Massachusetts), July 9, 1979, p. 15.

⁹Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts). July 10, 1979, sec. B, p. 2.

¹⁰Article by Samuel Weiss, New York Times, January 16, 1980, sec. B, p. 1.

¹¹Lyman A. Glenny and Walter E. Neece, The Nebraska Study of Higher Education, (Lincoln: 1961.)

¹²Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971.) Taken from a report Lyman Glenny gave to Washington Interim Committee on Education 1/22/1966.

¹³Lyman A. Glenny (et al.), State Budgeting for Higher Education: Data Digest, (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1975.)

¹⁴"...a special commission to study and suggest reforms in the Commonwealth's basic educational structure was appointed in 1962. The commission's staff was directed by Benjamin C. Willis, former Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools, and was chaired by State Senator Kevin B. Harrington. The commission proposed a series of recommendations in 1965 which were recently adopted and are significantly transforming education in the state." Taken from Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr., Education and State Politics, Teachers College Press, (Teachers College, Columbia University, 2nd Printing, 1971.)

¹⁵Chapter 9 of the Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (S 1790) provided for an investigation and study by a Special Commission relative to the evaluation and reorganization of public higher education in the Commonwealth, and allowed for 5 Senate members, 5 House of Representative members, and 10 gubernatorial appointments.

¹⁶Ibid

<u>Senate</u>	<u>House</u>	
Walter Boverini	Matrango	Pokaski
John Olver	Collins	Mullins
Mary Fonseca	King	Murray
Gerard D'Amico	Corazzini	Holland

¹⁸The final roster of the Executive Committee of the previous (1977) Special Commission is as follows:

Baker, (Judith)
 Boverini, (Sen. Walter)
 Collins, (Rep. James G.)
 Eliot, (Dr. Thomas)
 King, (Rep. Melvin H.)
 Olver, (Sen. John)
 Sherry, (Dr. Francis)

The document used in providing this list was entitled "Search Process for Executive Director" and was a part of the records of the 1977 Special Commission in storage within the office of the present Special Commission.

The document also lists the four finalists, including Richard Hailer, current executive director.

Interestingly, another current member of the Commission staff, Janet Slovin, was a semifinalist for the post of executive director.

¹⁹Boston Globe, Thursday, June 21, 1979, Metro/Region Section, p. 18.

²⁰Boston Herald American, Friday, September 21, 1979, sec. A, p. 6.

²¹This information was found in the Morning Union, (Springfield, Massachusetts), p. 16, June 25, 1979. A complete report of reorganization suggestions in Connecticut is on file in the office of the Special Commission on Reorganization, Room 15, State House, Boston, Massachusetts.

²²John B. Barnes and Gerald R. Reed (eds.), The Emerging State College, (Boise, Idaho: Boise State College Press, 1968.)

²³Senate Bill No. 1371, by Mr. Harrington, a petition of Kevin B. Harrington for legislation to reorganize the administration, coordination and planning of postsecondary educational affairs (1976).

²⁴House Bill 5756, an act to improve statewide oversight, coordination and planning for higher education, (1977) Michael S. Dukakis, Governor.

²⁵"Public Higher Education Planning", (working paper), August 17, 1977, Executive Office of Educational Affairs, Paul Parks, Secretary.

²⁶Paper of Kermit C. Morrissey, President, Boston State College. April 27, 1979, entitled "Massachusetts Public Higher Education - Time to Reorganize".

²⁷Paper of Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, August 31, 1979, prepared by Board of Higher Education staff members Seon Cho, Paul Rahmeier, Janice Green and Edward Wright, Jr.

²⁸Peter Abbs and Graham Carey, Proposal for a New College, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977.)

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰David M. Bartley, Former Speaker, Massachusetts House of Representatives.

³¹David Schuman, Bureaucracies, Organizations, and Administration: A Political Primer, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1976.)

_____. A Preface to Politics, 2nd Edition, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977.)

³²Public Financing of Higher Education, (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1966.)

³³Ernest G. Palola, (et al.), Higher Education by Design: The Sociology of Planning, (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1970.)

³⁴Amitai Etzioni, Readings on Modern Organizations, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.)

³⁵Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971.)

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Article in Boston Globe headlined "Campus Consolidation Considered Inevitable by Some", January 7, 1980, Metro/Region Section, p. 13.

³⁸John Finnegan, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Thomas McGee, Speaker of the House, William Bulger, President of the Senate, Chester Atkins, Chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee.

³⁹Boston Globe, January 15, 1980, p. 18.

⁴⁰Boston Herald American, February 1, 1980, sec. A, p. 6.

⁴¹Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971.) This was taken from Smith, G. Kerry (ed.), Cooperative Planning to Meet the Need of Increased Enrollments, Current Issues in Higher Education, Association for Higher Education, National Education Association, 1956, p. 321.

⁴²Remarks "at some point" made by Richard Hailer, Executive Director.

⁴³Parentheses and contents within put in by author.

⁴⁴Parentheses and contents within put in by author.

⁴⁵Present were:

Chancellor Corrigan, UMass/Boston

President Haskins, Roxbury Community College

President McKenzie, Massachusetts Bay Community College

President Morrissey, Boston State College

President Nolan, Massachusetts College of Art

President Shively, Bunker Hill Community College

⁴⁶Parentheses and contents within put in by author.

⁴⁷Reference of Senator D'Amico was made about the former President of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Dr. George Hazzard.

⁴⁸Robert Stuart serves as Executive Director of the State College Building Authority.

⁴⁹"Dover Project"--focus of a journalistic series commencing in the Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), of December 23, 1979 and continuing in the Morning Union, (Springfield, Massachusetts), December 24, 25 and 26, 1979. The articles were written by Jonathan Tilove, and dealt with the innovative task taken by the state college system in attempting to marry itself to high technology.

⁵⁰Dr. Russ Davis, Consultant to many world governments, professor at Harvard.

⁵¹It is my personal opinion that the Boston subgroup abdicated its responsibility when it allowed the institutions to establish the format of its visits, rather than doing it itself.

⁵²April 27, 1979, report of Kermit Morrissey entitled "Massachusetts Public Higher Education--Time to Reorganize."

⁵³Dr. John R. Rothermel, Program Development and Research, Boston State College.

⁵⁴It was stated that the median number of students participating in a cooperative program nationwide was 80; Boston State College had well over that, and expected to have between three and four hundred students in the program by 1984.

⁵⁵Dr. Carl Cedargren, Professor of Languages, Boston State College.

⁵⁶Cost per student comparison:

Boston State	UMass/Boston
\$1,768.00	\$3,200.00

⁵⁷Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd edition, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.)

⁵⁸Governor Foster Furcolo was appointed to the Board of Regents on August 1, 1980, by Governor Edward J. King. As of September 30, 1980, he exhibited perfect attendance at meetings of the Regents.

⁵⁹May 8, 1980 meeting of full Commission.

⁶⁰Only fifty-nine days remained until June 11, 1980. September 1, 1980 was yet another eighty-one days away.

⁶¹Correct spelling is baccalaureate.

⁶²Recommendations of University of Massachusetts President to University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees, Committee on Long-Range Planning. (Document T 80-023 of April 1, 1980).

⁶³The Massachusetts Teacher, published by Massachusetts Teachers Association, (Boston: April, 1980), p. 14.

⁶⁴House 6200 will be described in Appendix H.

⁶⁵Reverend Michael Walsh, former President of Boston College, and Dr. Francis Keppel, former United States Commissioner of Education.

⁶⁶Editorial in Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), April 20, 1980, sec. E, p. 2.

⁶⁷Boston Globe, May 5, 1980, p. 20.

⁶⁸The motion of Representative Collins called for a 21-member board, a nominating committee to make appointments to the board, two segmental boards (University and State College, and Community College), and strong powers.

⁶⁹It is important to note here that the Senate budget contained no outside language concerning reorganization.

⁷⁰"The Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education will conduct its study as quickly as possible, commensurate with providing a quality report.

The Special Commission believes its report will be heard by the Joint Committee on Education with public hearings...the normal legislative process.

The Special Commission respectfully requests that the Executive and Legislative leadership support efforts for a quality reorganization of public higher education."

⁷¹Motion taken directly from minutes of day session of Special Commission meeting of May 16, 1980 (actual wording of motion initially and officially passed was quite a bit different, but the sense remained the same.)

⁷²Sunday Republican, (Springfield, Massachusetts), May 18, 1980, p. 1.

⁷³Boston Globe, June 6, 1980, p. 21.

⁷⁴Morning Union, (Springfield, Massachusetts), June 6, 1980, p. 1.

⁷⁵Boston Globe, June 10, 1980, p. 1.

⁷⁶Boston Globe, June 11, 1980, p. 14.

⁷⁷Boston Globe, Tuesday, January 13, 1981, p. 1.

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 April 20, 1980, sec. B, p. 2.
 May 18, 1980, p. 1.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Reprinted from the Springfield (Ma.) Daily News,
August 18, 1979

A.A. Michelson

"Laws Hidden Inside Budget"

The general impression is that when the Legislature adopts a budget for the coming year it is simply approving a \$5.5 billion appropriation to meet the needs of state and local governments.

But there's much more to it. The multi-billion appropriation is only Section 2 of a 118-page document that includes 73 sections.

The last 71 sections are in prose, not in arithmetical figures. It is called the "outside section" of the budget and over the years it has been the source of much mischief.

Many state administrators today, for instance, who enjoy life tenure without ever having to subject themselves to a Civil Service test, are the beneficiaries of the outside section.

Many Jobs Added

Jobs used to be added in the outside section to agencies in wholesale lots, the recipients of the jobs

having been previously selected by legislators and the appointing authorities.

Today the outside section is less oriented to personalities than to policy. But even so it often reflects the feelings and prejudices of legislative leaders.

It is also used to catch up on some questionable practices the Ways and Means Committee had run into in its review of proposed appropriations submitted by executive agencies.

Section 49, for instance, inveighs against the munificence of public higher education boards.

Late last year, for instance, presidents of state colleges were granted pay raises of \$5,000 or more. The increases represented substantially more than the raises given other high-paid administrators of state government whose increases were geared to the percentage increase accorded all state workers following formal collective bargaining negotiations.

Sets Pay Ceiling

So Section 49 says any state employe (sic) whose salary is \$30,000 a year or more may not be paid any more than they were getting July 1, 1977, plus whatever has been allowed since then as a result of collective bargaining.

Section 41 allows legislators their regular expense allowance when the Legislature is not in session so long as

they are on "legislative business."

Section 40 appropriates \$50,000 for the Special Commission on Performing Arts. This is over and above Section 2 appropriations of \$2.3 million for the State Council on Arts and Humanities.

The Special Commission, it should be noted, is a pet project of Representative John J. Finnegan, D-Boston, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate President William M. Bulger, D-Boston.

Section 39 is aimed largely at mental health administrators. It decrees that no state official can enter into consent decrees without have (sic) the necessary funds to back up the costs of such a decree.

Closed State Hospitals

Last year mental health administrators signed consent decrees, virtually closing up state mental hospitals. There is a financial problem now as to how the released patients from those hospitals are going to be cared for in community facilities.

Section 29 orders the Department of Public Welfare to get a second medical opinion in all elective surgical cases for welfare recipients. This obviously reflects the feeling that too much questionable surgery has been performed.

A similar section was inserted directing the Department of Public Welfare to require that drug prescriptions

for welfare patients be filled by the generic name of the drug, "wherever possible." Drugs by their generic name cost one-third or more less than drugs by their brand names.

But the section that is farthest out in the outside section is the one which calls for the state government of Massachusetts to boycott goods manufactured by J.P. Stevens and Company, Inc., the giant textile firm which has thumbed its corporate nose at the National Labor Relations Board and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union for the past five years.

No Stevens Purchases

"No funds appropriated in this act," Section 54, declares, "shall be used by state institution, agency, commission or department for the purchase of goods manufactured by J.P. Stevens, Inc."

It is the handiwork of Sen. Chester D. Atkins, D-Concord, chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee. He was responding obviously to labor leaders and to the state's liberal constituency.

It's an extremely unusual tack. It could be that a majority in Massachusetts would be in favor of the Atkins boycott. It could be that it has great merit.

Stevens is an outfit that has been charged with unfair labor practices, encouraging illegal police surveillance, and violating civil rights of workers and organizers.

Prompts Film Story

The company's labor practices has prompted Hollywood to produce (sic) film, "Norma Rae" which depicts the trials and tribulations of a Southern woman trying to rally her co-workers against the company, and it has already grossed \$10 million.

Nevertheless, Section 54 has its disquieting aspects, too. For all its philosophical merits, it is (sic) bad kind of precedent.

The new law was never given a hearing. It was never debated on the floor of the House or Senate. It's a very serious controversial matter enacted in the dark.

And if a boycott of a company that may be unpopular in Massachusetts can become law through one man's prejudices today, it can also be directed in the future against a company by a legislative leader that doesn't have Chet Atkins' (sic) social consciousness.

APPENDIX B

MEMBERS OF SPECIAL COMMISSION

Commission Members (Gubernatorial Appointments)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointed</u>	<u>Withdrew</u>
James M. Howell	10/12/79	
Wayne Budd	10/12/79	12/79
Robert Spiller	10/12/79	
Arnold Friedman	10/12/79	
George Hazzard	10/12/79	
Dorothy Singer	10/12/79	
Francis Sherry	10/12/79	
James Hammond	10/12/79	
John Collins	10/12/79	
Foster Furcolo	10/12/79	4/80
Janet Robinson	1/29/80	
John Fox	5/9/80	

Commission Members (Senate)

Walter J. Boverini
 Robert C. Buell
 Gerard D'Amico
 Mary L. Fonseca
 John W. Olver

Commission Members (House)

Salvatore P. Cimino
 James G. Collins
 Leo R. Corazzini
 Iris K. Holland
 Melvin H. King
 Frank J. Matrango
 Joan M. Menard
 William D. Mullins
 Mary J. Murray
 Daniel F. Pokaski

Commission Members (ex officio)

Gregory Anrig	Commissioner of Education
Laura Clausen	Chancellor, Board of Higher Education
Charles Johnson	Secretary of Education
Michael Daly	Deputy Commissioner of Education

APPENDIX C

TRUSTEE POSITION PAPER ON REORGANIZATION

Reorganization of Public Higher Education

(Voted by the Board at its August 29, 1979 meeting.)

The Board of Trustees believes it is of utmost importance to the Commonwealth to maintain its statewide University, encompassing interrelated campuses at Amherst, Boston and Worcester and field, experiment, research and public service facilities throughout Massachusetts. The statewide University should continue to provide an integrated program of teaching, research and public service of the highest quality to the people of the Commonwealth. No plan of reorganization should be adopted which severs and isolates the Boston urban campus and its natural student constituencies from the benefits of the quality and prestigious programs offered by our statewide University.

Any reorganization of higher education in Massachusetts should clearly reflect the unique mission and responsibility of the statewide University, and should be based on a careful examination of the needs of the Commonwealth.

The relationship of any other existing institutions or segments to the statewide University should be carefully evaluated on the basis of their compatibility with those needs.

8/29/79

Principles for Statewide Organization
of Public Higher Education

Doc.T 79-085

The organization of public higher education in Massachusetts must reflect the needs of the Commonwealth. The following principles should guide any reorganization:

1. Massachusetts must have a system of public higher education of high quality, offering a range of programs diverse enough to meet the educational needs of its citizens.

Massachusetts must recognize public higher education primarily as an investment which will yield economic and social benefits. It must insist on quality at all levels of public higher education; the public should not be asked to support programs of poor quality.

2. Within the whole education system, the mission, role, and function of each segment or category of institutions must be more clearly differentiated.

Clearer understanding of each segment's role in a system will reduce wasteful redundancy of programs and will clarify the choice the student makes in seeking admission to a program. Admission criteria and practices should reflect the differing missions and programs of the segments.

3. Massachusetts needs a statewide public University with primary responsibility for liberal arts, pre-professional and professional education at the under-

graduate and graduate levels, and for research,
technical assistance and public service throughout
the Commonwealth.

Such an institution should be characterized in all its parts by quality faculty, as signified by a high percentage of terminal degrees and by active engagement in research and professional activity as well as in instruction. It should be able to meet all criteria appropriate for national recognition by accrediting bodies, including having a core of full-time faculty in all programs.

In addition to a residential campus and to the historic functions of the land-grant institution, it should have one or more urban campuses which provide access to commuting students and serve as a focal point for the delivery of public service and technical assistance to the public and private institutions and agencies concentrated in metropolitan areas.

Programs on all campuses should meet the criteria of quality faculty and eligibility for national recognition, and should extend across the range of activities appropriate for a University.

4. Massachusetts needs a network of community colleges with primary responsibility for two-year programs, providing ready access for local populations and responsive to local needs.

The community colleges provide two-year career-oriented technical programs, as well as programs providing entry points into higher education, with adequate opportunities for transfer into senior institutions.

5. In evaluating the continuing need for a third category of institutions, Massachusetts should consider defining more specifically the mission of its state colleges giving special attention to their offering of four-year career-oriented programs.

Such programs should be closely related to the areas of specialization of the community colleges in nearby areas, providing appropriate and logical extension of those programs in fields where career-oriented training beyond the Associate degree level is warranted. Close organizational coordination between community and state colleges is required for both regular degree and continuing education programs. The range of programs offered by state colleges should avoid redundancy, at least on a regional basis.

6. In reviewing the mission of its state colleges and their relationship to the community colleges, Massachusetts should carefully consider whether its educational needs require continued maintenance of the 10 state and 15 community colleges.

Such a review might indicate the feasibility of

reducing the number of institutions by merger or consolidation.

7. The review of institutions should be carried out region by region, and modifications of the present configuration should vary from one regional situation to another.

In each case it is important to take into account the existence of other institutions in close geographic proximity.

8. In recognizing the clearer differentiation of missions among the segments of higher education, Massachusetts must develop a governance structure which provides effective coordination, yet allows each segment and institution flexibility to respond to local needs and build on local strengths.

The structure should be sufficiently consolidated and inclusive to allow coordination and implementation of plans, but should maintain the functional differentiation of the segments and permit substantial delegation of authority to the local level. The structure should reflect major differences of mission and scope in varying types of institutions.

9. Massachusetts must maintain and strengthen a state wide coordinating mechanism, but this agency should not be responsible for the governance of any institution or segment.

The coordinating agency is not an advocate for any institution, segment, or sector. It should be responsible for providing the Governor and the General Court with reliable data and analyses for all institutions; should review all requests from public institutions for operating and capital outlay appropriations; should develop and update a statewide master plan defining scope and missions of all institutions; should review existing programs and new proposals for consistency with this plan; and should exercise the Collegiate Authority.

10. Both the governance and the coordination of higher education should be the responsibility of lay boards of high quality.

Boards should have full authority to appoint the chief executives and officers of their segment, institution, or agency.

Governing boards should have the fullest possible authority for management of resources appropriated for their segments and institutions, including the ability to shift resources among institutions. They should have full authority to establish tuition levels appropriate to their institutions.

11. In addition to the formal coordinating bodies, Massachusetts should provide ways for enhancing cooperation on a regional basis, including the private as

well as the public sector.

Consortia such as Five Colleges Inc. and the Worcester Consortium for Higher Education should be encouraged, and the potential usefulness of regional planning councils should be explored.

12. Massachusetts must strive to provide adequate access to higher education by offering a diversity of academic programs, by maintaining reasonable tuition levels supplemented by state tuition aid, and by eliminating both tangible and intangible barriers to equal access opportunity, for all qualified persons.

An adequate system of student financial assistance must be developed which takes into account opportunities for Massachusetts students in the private as well as the public sector.

A Possible Framework for the Reorganization of Public Higher Education in the Boston Area Doc.T 79-026

A. INTRODUCTION

Realignment of public higher education in the Boston area should be consistent with, and part of, a statewide reorganization. And it should be designed to meet the real educational requirements of the Commonwealth.

Massachusetts clearly needs:

-- A strong community college network offering two-year programs which provide both career-oriented technical training and opportunities for transfer into four-year institutions. These programs should be closely responsive to community needs, and their costs and admissions standards should be designed to insure maximum access;

-- A statewide University, combining residential and urban commuter campuses, emphasizing four-year undergraduate and graduate programs in professional fields and the liberal arts, and providing the research, technical assistance, and public service programs which are the historical responsibilities of state universities. Admissions criteria and costs should be consistent with the nature of its program.

Less clearly definable is the overall relationship of the state colleges to the general pattern of higher education. Many of them provide important opportunities for access to

higher education, but the total scope, mission, and number of colleges needs careful examination.

The review should be carried out case-by-case, taking into consideration the offerings and strengths of other institutions in the geographical area of each college. Modifications in the present system of state colleges should vary, we believe, from one region to another.

B. The Boston Area

Nowhere is the need for reviewing the continuing and unmet educational needs more pressing than in the Boston metropolitan area. As the state's major urban area, Boston needs the full range of educational programs, from two-year career-oriented technical training to advanced professional education.

Because its population includes large numbers both of educationally disadvantaged students and adults seeking part-time and in-service education, Boston especially needs diversity in the cost, time and mode of delivery, and location of its programs.

And the metropolitan area is likely to have increasing need for the technical assistance and public service capabilities of a University.

Because we can expect diminishing, or at best stable, financial support for the educational needs of the Boston we need a clear assessment of the essential programs and

institutions which can result in reconfigurations that eliminate wasteful duplication and cut back programs of lesser priority.

Presently, there is clearly considerable overlap among existing institutions and programs. The Commonwealth now supports two institutions in Boston--UMass/Boston and Boston State College--which offer a wide range of baccalaureate programs, although the total number of upper division (junior and senior level) students in the two institutions combined is only about 4,500 full-time equivalent (FTE). These programs and students could be much more effectively accommodated in a single institution.

Furthermore, Boston State and UMass/Boston now provide a first point of entry for many students who are seeking higher education but who have not yet developed well-defined interests and goals. A large proportion of these students would probably be better served initially by a strengthened community college.

In view of this, we suggest a new configuration of institutions as follows:

- 1) The University of Massachusetts Center at Boston, combining the current University of Massachusetts at Boston and the Massachusetts College of Art (maintained as a distinct unit), and assuming responsibility for: all four year undergraduate programs in the liberal arts and in pre-profes-

sional and professional areas deemed needed in the Boston area; all graduate programs; continuing education programs at an upper division undergraduate and graduate level; and lower division programs in those areas not available at the community colleges.

- 2) An expanded Community College network, primarily responsible for two year career oriented, technical programs, but offering, as well, transfer programs as needed. The Community Colleges would also provide continuing education at a lower division level as appropriate.

The principle (sic) objectives of this configuration would be:

- to provide educational services better suited to the needs of the Boston area and at less cost;
- to expand and strengthen the community colleges as the institutions most suitable to provide low cost access to the majority of entering students;
- to create a single institution which will accommodate the limited number of upper division and graduate students now in the system, doing so at the highest available level of quality;
- to bring the Massachusetts College of Art into the University of Massachusetts, thereby enhancing the capacity of both to provide advanced and graduate education while preserving the distinct identity

and character of the College of Art;

- to continue the development of the University of Massachusetts at Boston as a comprehensive university center capable of providing undergraduate and graduate education of the highest quality as well as the public service, research, and technical assistance functions to the statewide University system;
- to make possible a more effective and coordinated approach to the educational needs of adult and other non-traditional students;
- to provide clearer differentiation of mission, and therefore clearer choices for the benefit of potential students;
- to create a simpler institutional structure more adaptable to future changes in enrollment; and
- to accomplish these objectives at less cost than continuing the current expenditures for existing institutions.

This framework can form the basis of further discussion of feasibility (sic) and exploration of alternative approaches with all concerned.

APPENDIX D

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

NOTE: All listed are plans forwarded to the Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education and do not reflect official recommendations/actions of the Special Commission. All are on file in Room 15, State House, Boston, MA.

1973	H.6160 (Sargent/Cronin)	Board of Post-Secondary Education Five Regional Boards
1976	H.4623 (Dukakis)	Board of Overseers-charged with developing one of three alternative structures.
1976	H.4482 (Matrango/BHE)	Restructured BHE - 11 gubernatorial appointees.
1976	S.1371 (Harrington)	Board of Trustees of the Colleges and Universities of Massachusetts. Councils with limited authority at campus level.
1977	H.5756 (Dukakis)	Board of Overseers - Segmental Boards intact.
1977	Working draft (Dukakis/Parks)	Strengthened Coordinating Agency - Regional Boards.
1977	H.619 (Gannett)	Restructured BHE; increased powers
1978	Sloan Commission	Massachusetts Higher Ed. Commission Segments intact.
1979	McGuire	Restructured BHE; strengthened - 6 Segments (City U. of Boston)

1979	UMass. Board	Coordinating Board - Restructured Boston Institutions-Expanded Community Colleges.
1979	Kermit Morrissey	Single Board of Regents
1980	Community Colleges	Coordinating Board - Restructure Community College Board.
1980	MBRCC (Boston)	Two-Tiered governance system
1980	Foster Furcolo	Post-Secondary Education Commission Three Segmental Boards - Advisory Boards at each college.
1980	SMU	Coordinating Board, strengthened - Segments retain autonomy.
1980	H.6262 (Finnegan)	Board of Public Regents supplants Secretary of Ed; BHE; State College Board and Community College Board Universities retain autonomy All administrative staffs reduced.
1980	Secretary of Ed.	Expanded Exec. Ofc. of Ed. (with a planning council of 15 members and a program council of 11 members) re- places BHE.
1980	BHE	Expanded BHE (with planning, budget and program authority) replaces Exec. Ofc. of Education.

Note: Capitalization and punctuation have been duplicated exactly from the original paper obtained from the Special Commission.

APPENDIX E

GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE GOALS

DETERMINE:

- Role and function of Secretary's Office
- Role and function of a Central Board
- Powers a Central Board should exercise
- Structure of the systems: Community College,
state college, university
- Function of segmental or institutional boards
- Constitution of boards

WORK PLAN FOR COMMITTEE:

- Review major reorganization plans
- Analyze plans as they address major functions:
budget, planning, programs, etc.
- Evaluate effectiveness of present system as it
addresses major functions. Identify problem
areas
- Invite authors of reorganization plans to meet
with subcommittee
- Meet with constituency groups, perhaps on
different campuses throughout the state
- Review systems of other states
- Submit report and recommendations to full Commission

APPENDIX F

GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

PREAMBLE

In order to foster the development of well-planned, administered and coordinated institutions and policies of public higher education, to improve the quality and extend the benefits of education, to promote diversity of educational opportunity, and to encourage an economical and effective use of the public and private resources of the Commonwealth, the structure of public higher education within the Commonwealth is hereby redefined in accordance with the provisions of this act.

Board of Governors

Membership: 21 members

- 20 Gubernatorial appointees and the Governor or his/her Secretary of Education
- a Nominating Commission shall recommend to the Governor appointees to the Board
- Chairman elected by B.O.G.
- Members serve at large
- Staggered 5-year terms: limit 2 terms
- No member to receive remuneration from public/private higher education
- Transition membership (staggered appointments - no dual service):

State Colleges - 2

Community Colleges - 2

SMU - 1

U Lowell - 1

BHE - 3

-Chief Executive appointed by B.O.G. (? vote)

-B.O.G. has authority to transfer funds among its own
agency accounts

Powers of Board of Governors

Mission:

-approve/disapprove missions

Budget-Recommendations and Presentation:

-approve and authorize segmental maintenance and
capital outlay requests on FY 2-year cycle in accord-
ance with format set by B.O.G.

-present one consolidated budget by segment and
institutions to Governor and House and Senate Ways
and Means

Transferability of Funds

-authority to transfer funds among its own agency
accounts

-budgets appropriated by segments and institutions.

B.O.G. has authority to transfer funds among institu-
tions and segments in accordance with format set by
B.O.G. upon notification and approval of House and

Senate Ways and Means and Administration and Finance
-segments have the authority to transfer funds among
the institutions within their purview in accordance
with format set by B.O.G. and with B.O.G. approval
-institutions have authority to transfer funds among
accounts in accordance with format set by B.O.G. with
(segmental approval? advisory board approval?) and
with notification to segment and B.O.G.

Collective Bargaining:

An Office of Employee Service will be established
within the Board of Governors to

- coordinate collective bargaining efforts of
segments
- provide expertise and resources to the segments
- relate to the Office of Employee Relations in
matters of wage guidelines

Tuition Policy:

- authority to establish tuitions for public higher
education institutions

Capital Outlay:

- review capital outlay requests from segments
- recommend to legislature and governor capital outlay
expenditures. No capital outlay appropriation shall
be made without B.O.G. approval.
- B.O.G. may initiate capital requests

- (Await additional information from Ward Commission's recommendations on construction throughout the state)

Program:

- establish, review, approve and amend by majority vote programs and degrees for public higher education
- discontinue programs and degrees for public higher education by a 2/3 vote
- continue to exercise authority presently vested in Board of Higher Education for private institutions
- (Definition of program shall be as presently defined by Board of Higher Education)

Planning:

- establish 5-year master plan (including capital outlay planning) to present annually to legislature and governor.
- present to legislature and governor 2-year progress reports

Information:

- authority to collect and analyze data for purposes of establishing a management information system

Scholarship:

- Commission requests staff to research best possible approach to tie together all financial aid programs, including HELP, and to determine the efficacy of an autonomous agency

Affirmative Action:

- authority to establish affirmative action policy and take such actions as may be necessary to assure conformance with that policy

Collaboration:

- promote public/private collaboration and coordination
- promote intersegmental coordination and resolve conflicts over policy or operation

Segmental Boards

Segmental Boards would have the following responsibilities: (The number and make-up of boards would be determined at a later date.)

- establish mission statement for approval by B.O.G.
- establish and submit to B.O.G. for authorization maintenance and capital outlay budgets
- have the authority to transfer funds among the institutions within their purview in accordance with format set by B.O.G. and with B.O.G. approval
- conduct collective bargaining: serve as employer
- submit 5-year plan in accordance with mission statement for approval by B.O.G.
- submit 2-year progress report to B.O.G.
- determine academic policies
- establish personnel policies with authority to appoint, transfer, dismiss, promote and award tenure

- be the employer for the chief executive officer of segments and of chancellors of each institution
- set admissions policy in order to accomplish missions assigned to segments by B.O.G.
- set fees
- establish policies concerning physical plants
- establish affirmative action policies

Trustees of segmental boards will be nominated through the process established by a Nominating Commission.

Advisory Boards

Advisory Boards will be established at each institution with the following responsibilities:

- review institutional budget recommendations
- be represented by its chairman on the search committee for the chancellor of its institution
- serve to encourage linkage between community and institution

Secretary of Education

The governance of higher education shall rest with lay boards, as proposed by the Special Commission. Any statutory provisions for the Secretary of Education which conflict with this principle should be deleted.

The role of the Secretary of Education should be determined by the Governor, to whom he is an adviser, provided

that such role shall not be in conflict with the statutory authority of the lay boards.

APPENDIX G

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

*Two meetings on same day

F = Full Commission	B = Boston subgroup	G = Governance subgroup
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*Two meetings on same day

APPENDIX H

MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE BILL 6200

It is important to address the issue of what was contained in House 6200 and the ramifications of its final passage in the House.

House 6200, dated April 9, 1980, contained multiple sections dealing with a reorganization plan for higher education. This language was part of the budget, but was "outside of" the line items of the budget, hence the term outside language.

The reorganization language called for a combining of the state and community colleges, and the formation of a 15-member board of public regents to govern those 25 institutions. The University of Massachusetts, Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts would be governed by individual boards of trustees.

Concurrently, the language of 6200, pending approval, would abolish the Board of Higher Education, the Secretary of Educational Affairs, and the state and community college trustees.

None of this language appeared in the Governor's budget message, House I.

In fact, House I called for the amount of \$305,524.00 in the line item 7000-0100 labeled Executive Office of

6200 only allowed \$76,202.00 for the same line item.

Also, the line items 7101-0001 labeled Administration Division of State Colleges received \$1,054,140.00 in the Governor's budget message of House I, but only a recommendation of \$262,985.00 in the budget message of the House 6200.

Making it even more confusing is that during the proceedings of the House when House 6200 was being considered for passage, it is alleged that the Governor and members of his staff lobbied actively for passage of the outside language of House 6200, even though parts of it were diametrically opposed to House I.

During the debate prior to the eventual passage of House 6200, an attempt was made to repeal Sections 56-69 by Representative James Collins.

The attempt failed, 83-67, partly because of the massive dedication to passage of the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, partly because of the opposition to Representative Collins's move by the leadership of the House of Representatives, and partly because of the less than unanimous support of the House legislative members of the Special Commission. Representative Leo Corazzini, a House member of the Special Commission, voted against the proposal to remove the outside language pertaining to public higher education from House 6200.

The fight was certainly bitter on the House floor when the amendment was being debated. One of the suprising opponents of the amendment was Barney Frank, supposedly an avowed friend of education.

The subject of the House Bill 6200 would come up again among educators and others for the next couple of months. The Commission had worked for several months with the threat of a legislative reorganization package always just about to happen. Now it had happened.

However, the relief of it happening at last was overshadowed by the new fear that now that the House version of reorganization had passed, the Senate version (or Conference Committee version) could be worse.

APPENDIX I

Total

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John

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